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PROSECUTING THOSE BEARING 
“GREATEST RESPONSIBILITY”: THE 
LESSONS OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR 
SIERRA LEONE 
CHARLES CHERNOR JALLOH* 
This Article examines the controversial article 1(1) of the Statute of 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) giving that tribunal the 
competence “to prosecute those who bear the greatest responsibility” for 
serious international and domestic crimes committed during the latter part 
of the notoriously brutal Sierra Leonean conflict.  The debate that arose 
during the SCSL trials was whether this bare statement constituted a 
jurisdictional requirement that the prosecution must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt or merely a type of guideline for the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion.  The judges of the court split on the issue.  This 
paper is the first to critically assess the reasons why the tribunal’s judges 
disagreed in the interpretation of this seemingly simple legal question.  It 
then attempts to discern the common ground in the judicial reasoning, 
and argues that the ultimate conclusion that “greatest responsibility” 
implied that leaders as well as the worst killers may be prosecuted is a 
welcome jurisprudential contribution to our understanding of personal 
jurisdiction in international criminal law.  The paper makes several 
contributions to the literature.  First, it takes up and highlights a widely 
ignored but important legal question.  Second, it demonstrates why the 
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reasoning of the Appeals Chamber was results-oriented and wrong.  
Finally, it identifies the lessons of Sierra Leone and builds on them to 
offer preliminary recommendations on how the greatest responsibility 
conundrum can be avoided when drafting personal jurisdiction clauses 
for future ad hoc international penal tribunals.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Special Court for Sierra Leone (“SCSL” or “the court”) was 
established through a bilateral treaty between the United Nations and 
the Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL) signed on January 16, 2002.1  
The SCSL’s jurisdiction ratione materiae2 included crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, other serious violations of international 
humanitarian law, as well as various offenses under Sierra Leonean law 
prohibiting the abuse of underage girls, wanton destruction of property, 
and arson.3 Though the Sierra Leonean conflict started in March 1991,4 
the jurisdiction ratione temporis5 only covers the crimes perpetrated 
after November 30, 1996.6  This means that, over the objections of the 
national authorities, the international community, as represented by the 
U.N., only supported prosecution of the atrocities committed during the 
second half of the conflict.7  With respect to ratione loci jurisdiction,8 the 
Court was authorized to prosecute the crimes that occurred within the 
territory of Sierra Leone.9   
Given the SCSL’s limited subject matter, temporal, and territorial 
jurisdiction,10 it is evident that the U.N.’s goal was to establish an ad hoc 
tribunal with a narrower and more focused mandate compared to the 
International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda 
(ICTY and ICTR), which had been created by the Security Council 
(“UNSC” or “the Council”) in 1993 and 1994, respectively.11 
 
1. Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the 
Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, U.N.-Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 
U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter U.N.-Sierra Leone Agreement]. 
2. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 930 (9th ed. 2009) (directing reader from jurisdiction 
ratione materiae to subject-matter jurisdiction). 
3. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone arts. 2–5, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 
145 [hereinafter SCSL Statute]. 
4. U.N. Secretary-General, Report on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, ¶ 25, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (Oct. 4, 2000) [hereinafter Secretary-General, Report on 
SCSL]. 
5. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 930 (9th ed. 2009) (directing reader from jurisdiction 
ratione temporis to temporal jurisdiction). 
6. U.N.-Sierra Leone Agreement, supra note 1, art. 1(1); Secretary-General, Report on 
SCSL, supra note 4, ¶ 25. 
7. See SCSL Statute, supra note 3, art. 1(1).  
8. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1377 (9th ed. 2009) (“By reason of place.”). 
9. U.N.-Sierra Leone Agreement, supra note 1, art. 1(1). 
10. Secretary-General, Report on SCSL, supra note 4, ¶¶ 1, 12, 27. 
11. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993); S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994). 
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Article 1(1) of the U.N.-Sierra Leone Agreement, and its annexed 
statute, defined the Court’s ratione personae jurisdiction—that is, the 
“power to bring a person into its adjudicative process.”12  It gave the 
SCSL competence in the following terms: “to prosecute persons who 
bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law . . . including those leaders 
who, in committing such crimes, have threatened the establishment of 
and implementation of the peace process in Sierra Leone.”13 
A. Greatest Responsibility Jurisdiction and Its Significance 
There is no aspect of the Court’s jurisdiction that was more 
controversial than the notion that it should prosecute only those persons 
bearing “the greatest responsibility” for what happened in Sierra Leone 
during the second half of that country’s notoriously brutal conflict.  
Indeed, the idea of greatest responsibility had been controversial from 
the moment the UNSC proposed the phrase to the U.N. Secretary-
General (UNSG) as a way to define the SCSL’s personal jurisdiction in 
the resolution that it requested him to negotiate with the GoSL to 
establish the court.14  Several factors explain why this qualified personal 
jurisdiction was contentious, which in turn, make the issue worthy of 
further study in this article. 
First, while both the UN-Sierra Leone Agreement and the SCSL 
Statute included the phrase, neither specified what it meant.15  Yet, both 
instruments gave prominence to the idea as each mentioned the phrase 
at least twice: first, in the personal jurisdiction provision in Article 1(1),16 
 
12. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 930 (9th ed. 2009). 
13. SCSL Statute, supra note 3, art. 1 (emphasis added).  The Agreement between the 
United Nations and Sierra Leone also provided, in Article 1, as follows: 
 (1) There is hereby established a Special Court for Sierra Leone to prosecute 
persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra 
Leone since 30 November 1996. 
 (2) The Special Court shall function in accordance with the Statute of the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone.  The Statute is annexed to this Agreement and 
forms an integral part thereof.  
U.N.-Sierra Leone Agreement, supra note 1, art. 1. 
14. See S.C. Res. 1315, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (Aug. 14, 2000).  For an account of 
the controversy, see Report on SCSL, supra note 4, ¶¶ 29–31. 
15. Charles Chernor Jalloh, Special Court for Sierra Leone: Achieving Justice?, 32 MICH. 
J. INT’L L. 395, 413 (2011). 
16. SCSL Statute, supra note 3, art. 1(1); U.N.-Sierra Leone Agreement, supra note 1, 
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and second, in the clause setting out the powers of the prosecutor in 
Article 15 of the Statute.17  Although the framers appeared to have 
included these two provisions to underscore the court’s narrow 
jurisdiction and to ensure that the prosecutions would stay within the 
strict boundaries that they had demarcated, Article 1 and Article 15, 
when taken separately but also when considered together, sent two 
apparently contradictory messages.  
When taken separately, the provisions in Article 1 suggested, at least 
to the defense counsel and their clients, that the greatest responsibility 
phrase established a jurisdictional requirement that the prosecution 
must fulfill.18  A (perceived) failure to do so meant that the defense 
could challenge the non-compliance before the judges.  If successful, the 
defendants would not be prosecutable by the tribunal.  When taken 
together, Article 15 and Article 1 gave rise to a debate about the actual 
mandate and function of the prosecutor, in particular, the extent and 
limits of his discretion in deciding whom to prosecute.  Effectively, the 
defendants sought to take advantage of the vagueness of the greatest 
responsibility formulation in both provisions, attempting to further curb 
the scope of the prosecutorial power by suggesting that the prosecutor 
had acted beyond his competence in seeking to prosecute them instead 
of others.19  The problem is that the prosecution’s fight to keep its turf 
tended to exaggerate the broad scope of its authority and further 
masked the real nature of greatest responsibility jurisdiction. 
Second, although the UNSC, the U.N. Secretary-General, and the 
GoSL purportedly agreed on the meaning of “greatest responsibility” in 
the letters that they exchanged during the negotiations of the court’s 
founding instruments,20 the correspondence was marked by sharp 
disagreement and ultimately left a measure of ambiguity regarding the 
actual purpose and implications of the phrase.21  So, once the tribunal 
 
art. 1.  
17. SCSL Statute, supra note 3, art. 15(1). 
18. Jalloh, supra note 15, at 414–15. 
19. See discussion infra Part III.B–C. 
20. U.N. President of the S.C., Letter dated Jan. 31, 2001 from the President of the 
Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General, para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/2001/95 (Jan. 31, 
2001) [hereinafter Letter dated Jan. 31, 2001 from Pres. of S.C.]. 
21. Yet, undoubtedly because of awareness of the controversies that dogged this phrase 
in Sierra Leone, the draft statute for the Special Tribunal for Kenya, which ultimately failed 
to obtain sufficient support in that country’s Parliament, at least attempted to provide a 
definition.  See Special Tribunal for Kenya Bill, pt. I, § 2 (Jan. 28, 2009), available at 
http://www.kenyalaw.org/Downloads/Bills/2009/The_Special_Tribunal_for_Kenya_Statute_20
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was established and became operational, it would only take a matter of 
time for the issue to boil to the surface and for the judges to be asked to 
give their rulings on the subject. 
Third, starting with the International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg (“IMT” or “Nuremberg Tribunal”) continuing through the 
ad hoc ICTY and ICTR and the permanent International Criminal 
Court (ICC), the thrust of international criminal law has been to focus 
on prosecuting the top leaders and architects of mass atrocities.22  
However, this was the first time that the language mandating the 
prosecution of only those bearing greatest responsibility was introduced 
into the statute of an ad hoc, international, penal tribunal.23  Though on 
one level this could be argued to be an innovation in the SCSL, the 
reality is that, as this article will show, the vague greatest responsibility 
phrase was more of an explicit limitation on the court’s jurisdiction in 
terms of the number of people that it would eventually prosecute.24 
While the SCSL’s work is nearing completion, with appeals 
judgment outstanding solely in the case involving former Liberian 
President Charles Taylor as of this writing,25 the debate about the nature 
and scope of greatest responsibility is important for a proper assessment 
of the jurisprudential legacy of the court.  More significantly, it seems 
crucial because it might offer useful lessons for future formulations of 
personal jurisdiction in other international criminal courts.  Indeed, 
while both the ICTY and ICTR were endowed with personal 
jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute “persons responsible,” since the 
establishment of the SCSL, it appears that the “greatest responsibility” 
threshold has become the gold standard for the framing of ratione 
personae jurisdiction in contemporary international criminal courts. 
 
09.pdf. 
22. See discussion infra Part II.A–B. 
23. See SCSL Statute, supra note 3, art. 1(1). 
24. See infra Part II.B.  In fact, the President of the Special Court later presented the 
uniquely structured personal jurisdiction as an “innovation in the structure of international 
courts and tribunals.”  GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 
OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE (2002–2003), available at http://www.sc-
sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket= NRhDcbHrcSs%3d&tabid=176. 
25. Oral hearing of the appeal commenced at 10:00 a.m. on Jan. 22, 2013.  Prosecutor v. 
Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-A, Decision on Urgent Motion for Reconsideration or Review 
of “Scheduling Order,” (Dec. 5, 2012), available at http://www.sc-
sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=%2fE4wpxbRJr8%3d&tabid=191; Jennifer Easterday, 
Parties In Taylor Trial Make Appeals Submissions, THE TRIAL OF CHARLES TAYLOR (Jan. 
22, 2013), http://www.charlestaylortrial.org/2013/01/22/parties-in-taylor-trial-make-appeals-
submissions/. 
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Surprisingly, although a decade-long controversy persisted over the 
meaning of greatest responsibility at the court, the question of what 
exactly the phrase means and the benchmark, if any, that the 
prosecutors of international criminal courts with an expiry date should 
use to select those persons most deserving of prosecution inside their 
own courtrooms, as opposed to domestic ones, seems to have escaped 
the attention of scholars.26  Perhaps the general feeling outside the 
defense bar at the SCSL was that resolving this question would not 
change the outcome in the concrete cases brought by the prosecution, or 
that, as Professor David Cohen has argued, this type of narrow personal 
jurisdiction essentially relieved the court of the burden of deciding 
whether to prosecute any middle or lower ranking perpetrators.27  Or it 
may be that, as Professor William Schabas has suggested, academic 
lawyers recognized greatest responsibility as a rather vacuous concept 
that said more about donor generosity in the first court, which would be 
funded entirely by donations from states, than something with “any 
autonomous legal meaning.”28 
Yet, the moral and practical dangers of glossing over “greatest 
responsibility” jurisdiction will remain for time and resource constrained 
international criminal tribunals.  The SCSL’s attempt to grasp this 
proverbial nettle appears to, therefore, have wider significance for other 
penal courts tasked with a similar mandate.  This is all the more so 
because states increasingly resort to the greatest responsibility formula 
popularized by the court to indicate the attitude that the expensive work 
of international criminal tribunals should generally be limited to trials of 
only a handful of top leaders instead of a large number of perpetrators, 
including lower ranked suspects.29 
It is against this backdrop that this Article, which seeks to fill the 
current gap in the literature, will attempt to discern the meaning of 
“greatest responsibility” personal jurisdiction.  Its general aims are 
 
26. Although a Westlaw TP-ALL database search of the phrase “those who bear the 
greatest responsibility” returned approximately 120 results, only one article seems to have 
taken up the issue.  See Sean Morrison, Extraordinary Language in the Courts of Cambodia: 
Interpreting the Limiting Language and Personal Jurisdiction of the Cambodian Tribunal, 37 
CAP. U. L. REV. 583, 610–14 (2009). 
27. David Cohen, “Hybrid” Justice in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and Cambodia: 
“Lessons Learned” and Prospects for the Future, 43 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 11 (2007) (discussing 
the creation of the SCSL). 
28. W.A. Schabas, Genocide Trials and Gacaca Courts, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 879, 882 
n.11 (2005). 
29. See infra notes 75–79 and accompanying text.  
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twofold.  First, to determine how that phrase was developed, 
interpreted, and applied for the first time in international criminal law at 
the SCSL.  Essentially, even as the court introduced this phrase to our 
lexicon, I will examine whether the judges advanced our understanding 
of this type of narrow way of setting out personal jurisdiction, and, if so, 
how and if not, why not.  Second, to situate the SCSL’s experience 
within the broader normative evolution of international criminal justice.  
The idea is to identify, to the extent possible, the types of lessons that 
should be learned for future tribunals that might be expressly created 
with a limited mandate of bringing only the architects of the core crimes 
to justice.  Besides the moral dilemma inherent in conferring impunity 
on some through their non-prosecution, while prosecuting a few others, 
it is important to determine whether the SCSL devised a principled 
approach to greatest responsibility that might serve at least as a starting 
point for considerations of who should be the targets for internationally 
supported prosecutions from among a mass of perpetrators. 
Overall, while noting that the U.N., in particular the Security 
Council, made some problematic jurisdictional choices that ultimately 
resulted in the SCSL conducting an inadequate number of prosecutions 
compared to the ICTY and the ICTR, I will argue that the court’s 
jurisprudence on this question has offered international criminal law a 
useful starting point regarding how to determine who it is that may be 
said to bear greatest responsibility for the purposes of prosecution in an 
international criminal court.  That said, I will show that the 
interpretation preferred by the majority of the SCSL judges focused 
more on ensuring that those before the court would actually be tried 
rather than engaging the more challenging issue about how we might 
best distinguish between those that have greater versus lesser degrees of 
individual criminal responsibility for the international crimes committed 
in a given armed conflict. 
B. Structure of the Article and Main Arguments 
The article is organized as follows.  Part II provides a brief overview 
of the way that personal jurisdiction has been expressed in international 
criminal courts from the watershed Nuremberg International Military 
Tribunal to the present.  By reviewing the personal jurisdiction clauses 
of prior ad hoc courts, this section of the paper will demonstrate that the 
focus of such tribunals has generally been to punish only a limited group 
of persons in high-ranking leadership positions.  The tendency to 
emphasize the so-called big fish, instead of small fish, continued as a 
general matter with the modern ICTY and ICTR, and due to a variety 
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of factors, including concerns about costs and speed, reached its apex by 
the time the SCSL was formally established. 
In Part III, I examine the fierce disagreement regarding the meaning 
of “greatest responsibility,” which, driven by the challenges made by 
some defense counsel, arose between the judges of the two trial 
chambers at the SCSL.  I will show that Trial Chamber I correctly 
determined that greatest responsibility was intended to be both a 
jurisdictional requirement and a guideline for the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion, while Trial Chamber II incorrectly interpreted 
it solely as a type of guidance for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.  
Although the Appeals Chamber weighed in to endorse what I 
respectfully submit was the wrong interpretation, thereby weakening the 
value of the court’s case law on this issue, there was sufficient common 
ground among the majority of the SCSL judges.  We can therefore 
discern a clear jurisprudential path holding that greatest responsibility 
personal jurisdiction should be understood to include both those in 
leadership and high ranking positions as well as their most cruel 
underlings, whose conduct was so outrageous and beyond the pale that 
it merited international, rather than domestic, investigation and 
prosecution. 
In Part IV, I use established methods of treaty interpretation in an 
attempt to locate the ordinary meaning of the phrase “to prosecute 
persons who bear the greatest responsibility” in light of the text, object 
and purpose of the SCSL Statute and the drafting history of that 
provision, as well as the tribunal’s judicial practice.  In this regard, I 
assess the extent to which the solution proffered by the appeals court 
judges was consistent, or inconsistent, with the apparent intention 
behind the greatest responsibility clause articulated in Article 1.  I will 
contend that had the Appeals Chamber adopted a different reading of 
the law, it would still have been able to dispense justice—contrary to 
what it implied in its judgment—and in that way, would have made a 
better contribution to the court’s ultimate jurisprudential legacy. 
Part V draws some conclusions.  I offer preliminary reflections on 
ways treaty drafters might in the future alleviate some of the challenges 
inherent in deploying the greatest responsibility personal jurisdiction 
standard as the statutory mandate for the investigation and prosecution 
of some of the world’s worst crimes. 
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II. PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
FROM NUREMBERG TO FREETOWN 
A. The Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals Had Limited Personal 
Jurisdiction 
Although unique in its terminology, the SCSL is not alone in having 
a restricted personal jurisdiction.30  In fact, there is a discernible trend to 
limit international tribunal prosecutions to a relatively small group of 
political and military leaders deemed most responsible for the 
widespread violence.31  This doctrinal attitude dates back to the origins 
of modern international criminal law.32  It is predicated on the pragmatic 
recognition that individual accountability at the international level, 
when compared to domestic legal systems, can only be meted out swiftly 
and efficiently in relation to a small group of perpetrators.  Thus, by 
circumscribing the scope of international trials in the hope of deterring 
the top brass, rather than all of them together with their subordinates, 
international penal law also carves out an informal division of labor 
between national and international criminal jurisdictions.  One way it 
increasingly does this is to devise institutional mechanisms to ensure 
that the planners, leaders and others responsible for fomenting heinous 
international crimes are prosecuted at the international level wherever 
the relevant national jurisdictions are unable or unwilling to prosecute.33  
This arrangement anticipates that the middle and lower ranking suspects 
would be investigated and prosecuted in domestic courts so that there is 
no impunity gap.34  This general approach finds expression in the 
personal jurisdiction clauses of international criminal courts and in their 
 
30. See generally Morrison, supra note 26, at 605–15 (discussing the limiting language in 
personal jurisdiction statutes of ad hoc and hybrid tribunals, as well as the manner in which 
that language has been interpreted). 
31. See Morrison, supra  note 26, at 588.  See generally Cohen, supra note 27. 
32. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 
82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter IMT Charter]; see also Memorandum to President Roosevelt 
from the Secretaries of State and War and Attorney General, § III (Jan. 22, 1945), available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/jack01.asp (noting that the “outstanding offenders are, of 
course, those leaders of the Nazi Party and German Reich who since January 30, 1933, have 
been in control of formulating and executing Nazi policies”).   
33. See, e.g., ICC-OTP, Prosecutorial Strategy 2009–2012, para. 19 (Feb. 1, 2010) 
[hereinafter Prosecutorial Strategy]; Office of the Prosecutor, Report on Prosecutorial 
Strategy, pt. II, ICC (Sept. 14, 2006) [hereinafter Report on Prosecutorial Strategy]. 
34. See, e.g., Prosecutorial Strategy, supra note 33, para. 19; Report on Prosecutorial 
Strategy, supra note 33, pt. II.a. 
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practice.35 
Article 1 of the IMT Charter declared as its purpose “the just and 
prompt trial and punishment of the major war criminals of the 
European Axis.”36  Under the heading “Jurisdiction and General 
Principles,” Article 6 specified that the tribunal “shall have the power to 
try and punish persons who . . . whether as individuals or as members of 
organizations, committed . . . crimes against peace[,] . . . war crimes[,] . . . 
[and] crimes against humanity.”37  In a provision that seems to be more 
about the modes of participation in international crimes than about 
personal jurisdiction as such, Article 6 spelled out the types of 
individuals that were envisaged to fall within the personal jurisdiction as 
those “[l]eaders, organisers, instigators and accomplices participating in 
the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit 
any of the foregoing crimes” and, moreover, placed responsibility on 
these individuals “for all acts performed by any persons in execution of 
such plan.”38 The Tokyo Tribunal essentially reflected an identical 
position in Articles 1 and 5 of its statute,39 although its geographic focus 
was on the “major war criminals in the Far East,”40 whereas the IMT 
addressed those who masterminded the atrocities committed in the 
European theatre.41 
Despite some criticisms of those tribunals as “victor’s justice,”42 as 
part of their achievements, they did prosecute and convict high-ranking 
government officials associated with the German and Japanese wartime 
regimes.  In the Nuremberg Tribunal, these ranged from Herman 
 
35. See SCSL Statute, supra note 3, art. 1(1); Agreement Between the United Nations 
and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution Under Cambodian Law 
of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, U.N.-Cambodia, art. 1, 
June 6, 2003, 2329 U.N.T.S. 117 [hereinafter U.N.-Cambodian Agreement]; U.N.-Sierra 
Leone Agreement, supra note 1, art. 1(1); Morrison, supra note 26, at 587–88.  
36. IMT Charter, supra note 31, art. 1 (emphasis added). 
37. Id. art. 6. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. art. 1–6; cf. International Military Tribunal for the Far East arts. 1–5, Jan. 19, 
1946, 4 U.S.T. 20, T.I.A.S. No. 1589 [hereinafter IMTFE Charter], available at 
http://www.jus.uio.no/english/services/library/treaties/04/4-06/military-tribunal-far-east.xml. 
40. IMTFE Charter, supra note 39, art. 1. 
41. IMT Charter, supra note 32, art. 1. 
42. William A. Schabas, Victor’s Justice: Selecting “Situations” at the International 
Criminal Court, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 535, 537 (2010) (quoting Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case 
No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion Requesting Protective Measures for Victims 
and Witnesses, ¶ 21 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 10, 1995). 
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Goering, the “Successor Designate”43 to Adolf Hitler, to the commander 
in chief of the Germany Navy, Admiral Karl Doenitz, who later 
replaced the Fuehrer after he committed suicide, and to a number of 
other highly ranked military and civilian officials.44  Those prosecutions 
set the stage for the subsequent American and other allied national 
prosecutions of World War II offenses within their respective zones of 
occupation under Control Council Law 10.45  Even in the setting of allied 
country prosecutions, it was, at least initially, mainly senior military 
officers that were tried.46  These officers spanned from lieutenant 
colonels to majors, captains, and generals, as exemplified by, for 
instance, the United States v. Pohl case.47 
Similarly, at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East 
(IMTFE), twenty-eight of the eighty initially detained “Class A war 
criminals” were prosecuted, eighteen of whom were military officers.48  
United States Army General Douglas McArthur effectively shielded 
Japanese Emperor Hirohito from prosecution.49  However, the list of the 
others put on trial included four former Japanese premiers, six generals, 
several former ministers of war and foreign affairs, ranking 
ambassadors, and other important advisers on matters of state.50 
This brief summary appears sufficient to confirm that, although not 
employing the “greatest responsibility” language to delimit their 
personal jurisdiction, from the genesis of international criminal justice, 
 
43. International Military Tribunal, Indictment, app. A, in 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR 
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 27 (Oct. 6, 1945) 
[hereinafter IMT, Indictment, app. A], available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/counta.asp. 
44. Id. 
45. NUREMBERG TRIALS FINAL REPORT app. D (Dec. 20, 1945) (Control Council, Law 
No. 10, art. III), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imt10.asp. 
46. See id. art. 2; IMT, Indictment, app. A, supra note 43. 
47. United States v. Pohl, Indictment of the International Military Tribunal, Trials of the 
War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10, 
vol. 5 (Jan. 13, 1947), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/indict4.asp. 
48. United States v. Araki, Indictment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far 
East, app. E (1946), reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE TOKYO INTERNATIONAL MILITARY 
TRIBUNAL: CHARTER, INDICTMENT, AND JUDGMENTS 63–69 (Neil Boister & Robert Cryer 
eds., 2008) [hereinafter Araki Indictment]; see also TIMOTHY P. MAGA, JUDGMENT AT 
TOKYO: THE JAPANESE WAR CRIMES TRIALS 2 (2001) (noting that the eighty indicted men 
classified as “Class A war criminal suspects” including, “war ministers, former generals, 
economic and financial leaders, an imperial advisor, an admiral, and a colonel . . . were 
accused of plotting and carrying out a war of conquest; murdering, maiming, and ill-treating 
civilians and prisoners of war; plunder; rape; and ‘other barbaric cruelties”). 
49. HERBERT P. BIX, HIROHITO AND THE MAKING OF MODERN JAPAN 587 (2000). 
50. Araki Indictment, supra note 48, app. E. 
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the focus of cases in the ad hoc international courts has not been to 
prosecute everyone that might have committed a crime.  Rather, the 
objective has been to prosecute a smaller number of leaders, architects, 
and planners of the mass atrocities.  As with national criminal law, the 
assumption, although not yet empirically proven, seems to be that this 
philosophy will deter specific individuals as well as others, in a more 
general sense, who might otherwise emulate them in their repugnant 
conduct.  Indeed, the persons tried, both at Nuremberg and at Tokyo, 
were those that largely held important political and military posts in the 
government hierarchy.  For the most part, these were not direct 
perpetrators of crimes, but people who used, or rather abused, their 
positions of authority to order, instigate, or encourage subordinates to 
commit reprehensible crimes.51  The convicted perpetrators were 
deemed more culpable than their junior partners and enforcers who 
actually implemented their orders.52  In any event, in the other instances 
where the direct perpetrators of the crimes were prosecuted through 
national level prosecutions, the gravity, brutality, and scale of their 
crimes generally served as ample justification for their investigation, 
prosecution, and punishment. 
B. Contemporary International Tribunals Also Have Limited Personal 
Jurisdiction 
The ICTY and ICTR adopted similar ways of defining their personal 
jurisdictions as the IMT and IMTFE immediately after World War II.  
The context of their establishment suggested that they were also created 
to bring the top perpetrators of international crimes to justice.  Perhaps 
reflecting what may have been the golden age of international criminal 
justice, and its perceived high potential to assist in solving the 
intractable problems of impunity in post-conflict situations, in their 
respective jurisdictional provisions, the statutes of the U.N. twin 
tribunals both provided in their Article 1 that they “shall have the 
power to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law.”53  This was notably distinct from the 
 
51. See supra notes 43, 47 and accompanying text. 
52. See generally IMT, Indictment, supra note 43, app. A (referring to misuse of high-
ranking positions, personal influence, and intimate connections in the statement of 
responsibility for individuals indicted).   
53. See S.C. Res. 955, supra note 11, Annex I, art. 1 (emphasis added); U.N. Secretary-
General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council 
Resolution 808 (1993), U.N. Doc. S/25704, Annex I, art. 1 (May 3, 1993) [hereinafter ICTY 
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formulation used in the later Sierra Leone court conferring on the 
tribunal “the power to prosecute persons who bear the greatest 
responsibility” for the serious international humanitarian and Sierra 
Leonean law violations that took place in the context of that country’s 
conflict.54 
It is true that in the resolutions preceding the creation of the ICTY 
and ICTR, the UNSC repeatedly emphasized its determination to bring 
to justice all those persons responsible for the commission of 
international crimes.55  But those decisions should be understood in 
context.  They were taken at a time when the international community 
was faced with bitter and ongoing conflicts characterized by atrocity 
crimes and a climate of ongoing hostilities in which stopping the further 
commission of heinous offenses was an obvious international policy 
goal.56  They were thus worded in a way that exaggeratingly suggested 
that more than a limited group of perpetrators would be prosecuted and 
punished by each of those institutions.  This emphasis makes sense given 
the clear deterrent goal of international criminal law.  The reality 
proved to be different, however, although far more than the IMT and 
IMTFE, the U.N. tribunals have also succeeded in prosecuting a large 
part of the middle management of the atrocities in the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda respectively.  Sometimes, for various pragmatic 
reasons, such as the need to show concrete results in the early days, 
those ad hocs even ended up with prosecutions of otherwise insignificant 
perpetrators, such as Dusko Tadic and Jean-Paul Akayesu, who were 
not necessarily the most culpable persons in the grand scheme of 
things—at least when it comes to their official ranks.  In other words, 
even though those individuals were important, they were ultimately 
minor players who were not the brains behind the massive offenses 
committed in the Balkans and Africa during the early 1990s. 
The problem is that the initial enthusiasm for international criminal 
 
Statute] (emphasis added).  Articles 6 and 5 of the ICTY and ICTR Statutes, respectively, 
clarify that the jurisdiction of the tribunal only applies to natural persons.  ICTY statute, 
supra, art. 6; S.C. Res. 955, supra note 11, Annex I, art. 5.  Under Articles 15(1) and 16(1), the 
prosecutor’s role is to prosecute “persons responsible” for the serious violations of IHL 
committed in the former Yugoslavia.  S.C. Res. 955, supra note 11, Annex I, art. 15(1); ICTY 
statute, supra, art. 16(1).  U.N.S.C. Res. 808 and Res. 955 decided on February 22, 1993, and 
November 8, 1994, respectively, to establish the tribunal to prosecute “persons responsible.”  
S.C. Res. 808, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808, ¶ 1 (Feb. 22, 1993); S.C. Res. 955, supra note 11, art. 1. 
54. See SCSL Statute, supra note 3, art. 1. 
55. S.C. Res. 827, supra note 11, ¶ 2; S.C. Res. 955, supra note 11, ¶ 1. 
56. S.C. Res. 827, supra note 11; S.C. Res. 955, supra note 11. 
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justice, which coincided with the end of the Cold War and a new era of 
East–West cooperation in the Council, did not last.  In the intervening 
years between the creation of the ICTY and ICTR tribunals in 1993 and 
1994,57 and the Sierra Leone court in 2002,58 there had been much 
discussion among the powerful countries (especially the United States) 
about the viability of the ad hoc Chapter VII tribunal model.59  The so-
called “[t]ribunal fatigue,”60 driven primarily by concerns about the slow 
pace of the international trials and the spiraling costs of those U.N. 
courts,61 is said to have taken hold of the UNSC and the United States 
government in particular.62  It therefore seems like a deliberate decision, 
in a move to what was perceived to be a more financially viable and a 
more politically acceptable model, to limit the jurisdiction of future 
courts, like the SCSL, to prosecuting only a handful of persons in 
leadership positions deemed to bear greatest responsibility for the 
serious international humanitarian law violations committed during the 
West African nation’s war. 
Interestingly, although the phrasing of the personal jurisdiction 
clause that granted the SCSL authority was a departure from the 
equivalent personal jurisdiction language in the statutes for the U.N. 
Chapter VII tribunals,63 the ICTY and ICTR, in their respective Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence,64 jurisprudence,65 and Completion 
Strategies,66 now use similar language expressing the greatest 
 
57. S.C. Res. 827, supra note 11; S.C. Res. 955, supra note 11. 
58. U.N.-Sierra Leone Agreement, supra note 1, art. 1(1), (23). 
59. David J. Scheffer, Remarks, Challenges Confronting International Justice Issues, 4 
NEW ENG. INT’L & COMP. L. ANN. 1, 4–6 (1998). 
60. Scheffer, supra note 59, at 1.  
61. Morrison, supra note 26, at 587–88; Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the 
United States Relating to International Law, State Department Views on the Future of War 
Crimes Tribunals, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 482, 483 (2002). 
62. Scheffer, supra note 59, at 2.  
63. Compare SCSL Statute, supra note 3, art. 1(1) (“greatest responsibility”), with S.C. 
Res. 955, supra note 11, art. 1, and S.C. Res. 827, supra note 11, art. 2 (“persons responsible”). 
64. International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 
Rule 11 bis, 28, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 45 (Dec. 8, 2010); International Tribunal for Rwanda, 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. ITR/3/REV.1 (June 29, 1995). 
65. Prosecutor v. Luckic, Case No. IT-98-32/1-PT, Decision on the Referral of Case 
Pursuant to Rule 11 bis with Confidential Annex A and Annex B, ¶¶ 28, 30 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 5, 2007); Prosecutor v. Todoviü, Case No. IT-97-25/1-
AR11bis.1, Decision on Savo Todoviü’s Appeal Against Decision on Referral under Rule 11 
bis, ¶¶ 19–22 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 4, 2006). 
66. S.C. Res. 1503, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503 (Aug. 28, 2003); Completion Strategy for the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, transmitted by letter dated Oct. 3, 2003 from the 
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responsibility limitation.67  As the tribunals came under increased 
political pressure from the council to wrap up their work, they have had 
to identify the top layer deemed most responsible and appropriate for 
trial within their jurisdiction.68  They now leave it to the willing national 
jurisdictions to pursue the remainder of the fugitives, either through 
independently initiated prosecutions of lower ranked suspects or 
voluntary acceptance of transferred cases of the alleged middle level 
perpetrators to national courts.69 
Similarly, in the other ad hoc criminal court negotiated by the U.N. 
with one of its member states around the same time period as the SCSL, 
the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC or 
Cambodia Tribunal), the international community adopted a similarly 
worded jurisdictional provision.70  This lends further credence to the 
idea of tribunal fatigue taking hold at the level of U.N. member states, 
although a different set of factors including a government that was not 
always necessarily acting in good faith, were at play in the Cambodia 
context, as compared to the Sierra Leone negotiations with the U.N., 
which demonstrated strong national–political will to deal with the 
question of accountability for the international crimes experienced 
during the conflict. 
Be that as it may, Article 1 of the ECCC Law empowered it to 
prosecute the “senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those who 
were most responsible for the crimes.”71  Much like the Sierra Leone 
Court, which was also territorially and temporally confined in its ability 
to prosecute compared to the ICTY and ICTR, the Cambodia Tribunal 
was intended to carry out a limited number of prosecutions of senior 
leaders along with those apparently deemed to possess the greatest level 
 
Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2003/946, 
para. 6 (Oct. 6, 2003). 
67. See supra notes 63–66.   
68. Murphy, supra note 61, at 483 (on U.S. encouragement of ad hoc tribunal 
completion strategies); Pierre-Richard Prosper & Michael A. Newton, The Bush 
Administration View of International Accountability, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 891, 897 (2002) 
(on U.S. support for the greatest responsibility limitation). 
69. Prosper & Newton, supra note 68, at 896–97. 
70. Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, as 
amended, Reach Kram., No. NS/RKM/1004/006, Oct. 27, 2004 (Cambodia) [hereinafter 
ECCC Law],  available  at  http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/legal-documents/KR_La
w_as_amended_27_Oct_2004_Eng.pdf and http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/legal-doc
uments/Kram_and_KR_Law_amendments_27_Oct_2004_--_Eng.pdf (unofficial translation). 
71. ECCC Law, supra note 70, art. 1; U.N.-Cambodian Agreement, supra note 35, art. 1. 
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of responsibility.72 
In the same vein, although having a distinctive multilateral treaty 
basis, vis-à-vis the ad hoc tribunals, Article 1 of the Rome Statute of the 
permanent Hague-based International Criminal Court (ICC) defines the 
competence of the global penal court as the power to “exercise its 
jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international 
concern.”73  There is plainly no explicit limitation on the ICC’s personal 
jurisdiction, although it appears that most states were clearly more 
interested in having a broad personal jurisdiction for the permanent 
international tribunal than a narrower one.74 
On the other hand, this might have been less of an issue since 
various restrictions were imposed on the permanent court’s jurisdiction 
through several carefully negotiated substantive provisions that gave the 
first bite at the prosecutorial apple to states.  However, rather 
interestingly, the ICC Prosecutor has in her policy papers, strategy 
documents and emerging practice interpreted this reference to personal 
jurisdiction as mandating a focus only on those “who bear the greatest 
responsibility.”75  The foregoing brief review suggests that, as states have 
developed more experience designing and managing international 
criminal tribunals, they increasingly seem to prefer to confer a relatively 
narrow type of personal jurisdiction—at least when it comes to the more 
 
72. ECCC Law, supra note 70; U.N.-Cambodian Agreement, supra note 35, art. 1.  
Although, even though it is expected to only prosecute a handful of people, Article (1) of the 
Statute of the Lebanon Tribunal has, perhaps as a reflection of a lesson learned by the 
Secretary-General about the controversies of greatest responsibility, returned to use of the 
phrase “to prosecute persons responsible.”  S.C. Res. 1757, Annex, art. 1, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1757 (May 30, 2007). 
73. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 1, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
90 (emphasis added). 
74. See id. art. 1 & pmbl. 
75. See ICC-OTP, Paper on Some Policy Issues Before the Office of the Prosecutor 7 
(Sept. 2003), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/1fa7c4c6-de5f-42b7-8b25-
60aa962ed8b6/143594/030905_policy_paper.pdf (stating that the Office of the Prosecutor will 
“focus its investigative and prosecutorial efforts and resources on those who bear the greatest 
responsibility, such as the leaders of the State or organization allegedly responsible for those 
crimes” (emphasis omitted)); see also Prosecutorial Strategy, supra note 35, para. 19 (“In 
accordance with this statutory scheme, the Office consolidated a policy of focused 
investigations and prosecutions, meaning it will investigate and prosecute those who bear the 
greatest responsibility for the most serious crimes, based on the evidence that emerges in the 
course of an investigation.”  (emphasis omitted)); Report on Prosecutorial Strategy, supra note 
35, para. 2(b); Luis Moreno-Ocampo, The International Criminal Court: Seeking Global 
Justice, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 215, 221 (2008) (stating that “[m]y role is to prosecute 
those bearing the greatest responsibility for the most serious crimes”). 
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prominent, situation-specific ad hoc international criminal courts like 
the SCSL.  Much of this was concern about controlling spiraling costs 
and keeping the international justice project on the cheap. 
This broader international context helps to explain why the U.N., 
and in particular the Security Council, introduced the problematic 
“greatest responsibility” personal jurisdiction into international criminal 
law’s lexicon through the SCSL Statute.  It therefore suggests reasons to 
be cautious in celebrating the addition of this phrase into our vocabulary 
because of what it implies.  The phrase effectively signals the reduced 
political will amongst states to ensure the broadest possible 
investigations and prosecutions of perpetrators of serious international 
offenses that reach beneath the top layer to uncover others, perhaps of a 
lesser rank, who should also be held accountable for mass crimes.  On 
the other hand, it may be countered that settling on a particular and 
more realistic phraseology for personal jurisdiction is part of the 
maturing of international criminal tribunals.  It can also be seen as a way 
to manage the currently high expectations about what these courts can 
realistically contribute in societies torn apart by brutal conflict.  
Be that as it may, at the end of the day, more than any other factor, 
the UNSC’s decision to limit the jurisdiction of the SCSL to those with 
greatest responsibility was driven by pragmatic, political, economic, and 
other realpolitik considerations.  This in turn affected the mandate that 
the court was given—essentially, to investigate and prosecute a handful 
of persons in leadership positions based on a strict personal, temporal, 
and territorial jurisdiction,76 which would help to ensure, it was hoped at 
the time, that all the court’s trials would be completed within three 
years.77 
III. THE JUDICIAL DEBATE REGARDING THE MEANING OF GREATEST 
RESPONSIBILITY IN THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE 
A. Approaches to Interpretation of Greatest Responsibility 
Once indictments were issued and suspects were arrested, some of 
 
76. See SCSL Statute, supra note 3, art. 1(1). 
77. As I have argued elsewhere, the number of persons that it was expected would be 
prosecuted by the SCSL reportedly totaled between two to three dozen.  See Jalloh, supra 
note 15, at 420–22.  Unfortunately, the tribunal, partly because of this constrained greatest 
responsibility mandate and a conservative prosecutorial interpretation of that language, only 
successfully completed about nine cases.  Id.  For a court that operated for over ten years, this 
meant that the tribunal averaged less than one case per year.  Id. (criticizing the “extremely 
small number of trials” ultimately carried out).  
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the defense counsel at the SCSL immediately filed motions asking the 
judges to clarify the exact scope of Article 1(1) of the SCSL Statute, 
which is entitled “Competence of the Special Court.”78  As the provision 
is key to the analysis in this article, and was reproduced in essentially the 
same form in Article 1(1) of the UN-Sierra Leone Agreement, to which 
the statute was an annex, it is worth setting out in full, as follows: 
The Special Court shall, except as provided in subparagraph (2), 
have the power to prosecute persons who bear the greatest 
responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian 
law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra 
Leone since 30 November 1996, including those leaders who, in 
committing such crimes, have threatened the establishment of 
and implementation of the peace process in Sierra Leone.79 
In construing this clause, honing in for now on the vague italicized 
portion, at least three possible interpretations can be discerned.80   
 The first is that Article 1(1) required the prosecution of the persons 
deemed most responsible or most culpable for the serious crimes 
perpetrated in Sierra Leone.  On this view, a key criterion for selection 
could be the rank or position held by the persons in this category and 
whether they were the movers and shakers behind the conflict and the 
widespread commission of the crimes.  This interpretation, which as we 
shall see later was apparently the one preferred by the prosecution,81 
would emphasize the leadership status of the suspect and whether the 
suspect had the capacity to impact the general course of events over the 
years of the war, but failed to prevent or punish the wrongful conduct of 
the perpetrators.  The thrust would effectively be on the top political 
and or military leaders who committed, planned, instigated, ordered, or 
otherwise aided and abetted the heinous international crimes that were 
perpetrated by the combatants under their command, control and 
supervision.  For convenience, in this Article, we may call this the 
political-military leader category. 
 
78. SCSL Statute, supra note 3, art. 1; see, e.g., Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-
04-14-PT, Decision on the Preliminary Defence Motion on the Lack of Personal Jurisdiction 
Filed on Behalf of Accused Fofana, ¶¶ 1–2 (Mar. 3, 2004). 
79. SCSL Statute, supra note 3, art. 1(1) (emphasis added); See U.N.-Sierra Leone 
Agreement, supra note 1, art. 1. 
80. Further on in this Article, I will examine the second part of that phrase reading as 
follows: including those leaders who, in committing such crimes, have threatened the 
establishment of and implementation of the peace process in Sierra Leone. 
81. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
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A second interpretation implied by the greatest responsibility 
language in the above provision was that the court prosecutor could 
scour the lower rank and file who perpetrated the various crimes within 
the SCSL’s jurisdiction and select from among them those who did not 
necessarily hold high ranking positions in the military or political 
structures of the various parties to the conflict.  Instead, he would 
choose those who were most cruel and most notorious for the brutality 
and depravity of their crimes.  In other words, the jurisdiction could be 
read as a directive to pursue the worst persons, killers, or ordinary 
combatants whose criminal acts caused the most harm, to the most 
victims, in the most brutal way during the period falling within the 
SCSL’s temporal jurisdiction.  We could refer to this group of 
prospective suspects bearing greatest responsibility as the killer-
perpetrator category. 
Irrespective of which of the above two categories a particular 
defendant falls into, it is likely that he would argue that he fell outside 
the jurisdiction of the court because he was merely a foot soldier, rather 
than a political or military leader, and vice versa.  But many lawyers 
might perhaps agree more with the third plausible interpretation of the 
first part of Article 1(1).  In this view, asserting that the tribunal has 
power to prosecute those bearing greatest responsibility would indicate 
that individuals from either, or better yet, both the political-military 
leadership and the killer-perpetrator categories are prosecutable.  The 
latter interpretation of the clause, its drafting history,82 as well as the 
SCSL’s practice seems to confirm that the last is ultimately the better 
and more flexible way to construe the greatest responsibility personal 
jurisdiction—at least from a prosecutorial and, perhaps, even an 
interest-of-justice perspective. 
The simplicity with which these three plausible interpretations of 
Article 1(1) of the SCSL Statute are suggested here belies the fierce 
judicial discord on how best to interpret this phrase amongst the judges 
of Trial Chambers I and II.  It also masks the fact that the prosecution 
faced a steady stream of challenges from the defense, throughout some 
of the trials, claiming that the accused should not be prosecuted because 
they were not among those envisaged to fall within the jurisdiction of 
the tribunal.  Indeed, so much time and energy was wasted by lawyers 
and judges debating the meaning of greatest responsibility that it might 
even have had a chilling effect on the prosecutor’s decision not to 
 
82. See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
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pursue additional suspects for the crimes apparently committed in Sierra 
Leone. 
Nonetheless, despite curiously reaching divergent legal conclusions 
as to whether Article 1(1) was a jurisdictional requirement (Trial 
Chamber I)83 or a mere guideline for prosecutorial strategy (Trial 
Chamber II),84 the SCSL judges were in general agreement that the 
phrase mandating the prosecution of those bearing greatest 
responsibility contained in the tribunal statute implicitly included what I 
have here characterized as the political-military leadership and killer-
perpetrator categories.85  Put differently, even though the phrase 
“greatest responsibility” was highly divisive when debated during the 
Freetown trials,86 a lesson from the SCSL case law is that the greatest 
responsibility phrase should, as a prima facie matter, be interpreted as a 
broad jurisdictional grant capable of covering both different types of 
actors and different types of conduct in a given armed conflict.87 
That said, as I will endeavor to show shortly, a review of the relevant 
case law demonstrates that there was conflation of several important 
questions that muddied the greatest responsibility waters even further.  
For analytical purposes, these could be broken down into the following 
sub-issues: (1) whether the phrase to prosecute persons bearing greatest 
responsibility established a jurisdictional threshold or was a type of 
guidance for the prosecutor’s determination of whom to prosecute; (2) if 
so, the timing or stage of the proceedings during which an accused 
should raise the objection that the tribunal lacks authority to try him 
because he did not bear greatest responsibility; (3) the evidentiary 
burden that the defense would have to discharge if they chose to raise 
the issue (and the nature of the prosecution’s burden to counter it); 
(4) the role of the evidence and judges in the assessment of greatest 
responsibility; and, finally, (5) the consequences of positive or negative 
findings on jurisdiction for the defendant, the prosecutor, and the 
tribunal itself.  For space reasons, the next part of this Article will only 
take up analysis of the first of these five issues.   
 
83. Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, Decision on the Preliminary Defence Motion, 
¶ 27. 
84. Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 653 (July 20, 2007). 
85. Compare Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, Decision on the Preliminary Defence 
Motion, ¶¶ 23–27, with Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Decision on Defence Motion for 
Judgment of Acquittal Pursuant to Rule 98, ¶¶ 30–34 (Mar. 31, 2006). 
86. See, e.g., Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Decision on Defence Motion, ¶¶ 28–29. 
87. Id. ¶¶ 34–35. 
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B. Greatest Responsibility as a Jurisdictional Requirement 
In the first defense motion to raise the argument that the SCSL was 
not entitled to try a particular defendant because it lacked the legal 
capacity or power to do so, the assigned counsel for Moinina Fofana88 
filed a preliminary jurisdictional challenge before Trial Chamber I on 
November 17, 2003.89  The counsel submitted that the court did not have 
personal jurisdiction over Fofana because the suspect fell outside the 
category of persons who bore “the greatest responsibility” for the 
alleged serious international humanitarian law violations contained in 
his indictment.90 
The defense asserted that the personal jurisdiction discussed in 
Article 1(1) of the tribunal statute could be interpreted in one of two 
ways.91  First, as a reference to the leaders of the parties or states bearing 
the greatest responsibility for the Sierra Leonean armed conflict, 
including those who had threatened the peace process.92  Second, and 
alternatively, as a way of referring to those individuals responsible for 
most of the crimes committed during the armed conflict.93  According to 
the defense, neither Fofana’s indictment nor the subsequent 
prosecution’s disclosure of evidence supported the view that Fofana 
belonged to the latter class of persons.94  Indeed, under neither 
 
88. Moinina Fofana held the rank as the National Director of War of the CDF, the 
armed state-supported militia faction involved in the Sierra Leone conflict.  See Norman, 
Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, Decision on the Preliminary Defence Motion, ¶ 42; Prosecutor v. 
Fofana, Case No. SCSL-2003-11-PT, Preliminary Defence Motion on the Lack of Personal 
Jurisdiction, ¶ 14 (Nov. 17, 2003), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl/Public/SCSL-03-11-
Fofana/SCSL-03-11-PT-062.pdf. 
89. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-2003-11-PT, Preliminary Defence Motion. 
90. Id. ¶ 2.  Rule 72B of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence provides: 
Preliminary motions by the accused are (i) objections based on lack of jurisdiction; 
(ii) objections based on defects in the form of the indictment; (iii) applications for 
severance of crimes joined in one indictment Rule 49, or for separate trials under 
Rule 82(B); (iv) objections based on the denial of request for assignment of counsel; 
or (v) objections based on abuse of process.  
Special Court for Sierra Leone, Rules of Procedure and Evidence (amended Mar. 7, 2003), 
available at http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=1YNrqhd4L5s%3D&tabid=70.  
The Rules further provide that “[o]bjections based on lack of jurisdiction or to the form of 
the indictment, including an amended indictment, shall be raised by a party in one motion 
only, unless otherwise allowed by the Trial Chamber.”  Id. at 72C.  
91. Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, Decision on the Preliminary Defence Motion, 
¶ 2. 
92. Id. ¶ 2(a). 
93. Id. ¶ 2(b). 
94. Id. ¶ 2. 
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interpretation could he be deemed among those bearing greatest 
responsibility and therefore properly within the court’s personal 
jurisdiction. 
The prosecution responded that the documents forming the context 
for the establishment of the SCSL amply showed that the question 
whether a particular person is one of those who bore the greatest 
responsibility was a matter of prosecutorial discretion based on the 
evidence collected during the investigations.95  To justify judicial review 
of the exercise of that discretion, the defendant needed to demonstrate 
that the prosecutor unlawfully exercised his power or acted based on 
improper or impermissible discriminatory motives.96  The accused had 
failed to adduce any proof establishing such intentions.97  According to 
the prosecution, although defense counsel had suggested that Fofana 
was associated with the Civil Defense Forces (CDF) militia that was 
known more for its work in attempting to restore peace in Sierra Leone, 
rather than the commission of international crimes, this was not 
substantiation that he might not ultimately be found among those 
bearing greatest responsibility.98  Fofana was, in any event, a leader 
fitting that description since he had been the second in command of the 
CDF organization, as had been alleged in his indictment.99 
In its unanimous ruling, Trial Chamber I reviewed the drafting 
history of the provision and correspondence between the U.N. 
Secretary-General and the Security Council discussing “greatest 
responsibility” and the former’s proposed alternative to use those “most 
responsible”100 instead.  The judges rightly pointed out that the UNSC’s 
preference was to limit the jurisdiction of the SCSL primarily to the 
prosecution of those who had played a leadership role.101  But the UNSG 
had insisted that the greatest responsibility clause should not be taken to 
imply that personal jurisdiction would only be limited to the political 
 
95. Id. ¶ 5; see also Fofana, Case No. SCSL-2003-11-PT, Prosecution Response to the 
Defence Preliminary Motion on Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, ¶ 6 (Nov. 26, 2003), available 
at http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl/Public/SCSL-03-11-Fofana/SCSL-03-11-PT-074/SCSL-03-11-PT-
074-I.pdf. 
96. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-2003-11-PT, Prosecution Response, ¶ 12–14. 
97. Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, Decision on the Preliminary Defence Motion, 
¶ 7. 
98. Id. ¶ 8. 
99. Id. ¶ 10. 
100. Id. ¶ 40. 
101. Id.  
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and military leaders.102  He argued that it would also extend to others on 
the basis of the scale or severity of their crimes.103  After this review, 
Trial Chamber I unanimously concluded that “the issue of personal 
jurisdiction is a jurisdictional requirement, and while it does of course 
guide the prosecutorial strategy, it does not exclusively articulate 
prosecutorial discretion, as the prosecution has submitted.”104 
Having essentially determined that Article 1(1) established a 
jurisdictional threshold, which the prosecution ought to show it could 
fulfill, the judges ruled that the prosecution had discharged that burden 
in the context of that particular case.105  They were satisfied that Fofana 
appeared to fall within the court’s personal jurisdiction because there 
was sufficient prima facie evidence tending to show that he held a 
leadership position as the number two person in the CDF—one of the 
main parties in Sierra Leone’s armed conflict.106  They underscored, 
however, that whether or not he could be found to be among those 
holding greatest responsibility is a factual and “an evidentiary matter to 
be determined at the trial stage.”107  The chamber clarified that, at the 
stage of the defense’s preliminary motion, it was merely concerned with 
basic allegations.108  It therefore correctly underscored that it was not, in 
reaching this finding, pronouncing Fofana’s final guilt or innocence, 
which would only be adjudged after the conclusion of his trial.109 
In their judgment on the merits, which followed several years later, 
Trial Chamber I reiterated its initial holding that Article 1(1) created a 
jurisdictional requirement.110  However, although the judges had (at the 
preliminary motions stage) deferred the question of whether Fofana was 
in actuality one of those bearing greatest responsibility until the end of 
the trial (because such assessment could only follow after hearing all the 
evidence against the accused), it appeared to sidestep the issue.  It 
reasoned that the personal jurisdiction requirement did not constitute a 
 
102. U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated Jan. 12, 2001 from the Secretary-General 
addressed to the President of the Security Council, para. 2, U.N. Doc. S/2001/40 (Jan. 12, 
2001) [hereinafter Letter dated Jan. 12, 2001 from Secretary-General].  
103. Id. paras. 2–3. 
104. Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, Decision on the Preliminary Defence Motion, 
¶ 27. 
105. Id. ¶ 45. 
106. Id. ¶ 42. 
107. Id. ¶ 44. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. ¶ 47. 
110. Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 91–92 (Aug. 2, 2007). 
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legal or material ingredient of the crimes.  It followed that the 
prosecutor did not need to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Fofana was one of those in fact bearing greatest responsibility in order 
to secure a conviction. 
Put differently, at the judgment stage when it decided Fofana was 
actually guilty, the trial chamber implied that it had accepted the 
prosecutor’s conclusion that the defendant was one of those in fact 
bearing greatest responsibility for what happened in Sierra Leone.  This 
suggests that it saw the assessment of whether personal jurisdiction 
existed to try Fofana as being only a relevant question for consideration 
at the indictment review stage on a standard of reasonable basis to 
believe, as opposed to a matter to be put to prosecutorial proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt during or at the completion of the trial. 
Two other observations seem pertinent about Trial Chamber I’s 
analysis of the greatest responsibility in Article 1(1).  First, it helpfully 
clarified that the clause should essentially be understood as expressing 
two separate, if closely related, ideas.  To begin with, the phrase 
confirmed that the prosecution of persons who bear the greatest 
responsibility constituted a personal jurisdictional requirement before 
the court and that it is the prosecutor’s function in carrying out the 
mandate that is then prescribed in Article 15.111  This meant that the 
prosecution must establish that a particular suspect fulfilled this 
criterion by tendering evidence, assessed at the low reasonable basis to 
believe indictment review threshold, that the person was a leader 
(whether military or political) appearing to be one of those bearing 
greatest responsibility.  If the prosecution meets the burden—which 
would not be difficult because the threshold is very low—of having 
reasonable grounds to believe that the suspect in question committed 
the crime charged, then the chamber can properly try the defendant.  
Conversely, if the prosecution failed to prove even a prima facie case 
against the suspect, showing that the court has jurisdiction over him 
covering particular crimes on a given territory during an appropriate 
time period, then the chamber would have to dismiss the case.  The 
court’s logic was likely that the suspect did not need to endure an 
unnecessary trial when the SCSL lacked the basic personal, temporal 
and subject matter jurisdiction to try him. 
A related point is that, unlike the first part of Article 1(1) of the 
 
111. Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, Decision on the Preliminary Defence Motion, 
¶¶ 21, 26, 27. 
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SCSL Statute, the chamber implied that the second part of the same 
sentence, “including those leaders who, in committing such crimes, have 
threatened the establishment of and implementation of the peace 
process in Sierra Leone[,]” was not an element of the crime.112  Rather, it 
was intended to serve as a type of guideline to the prosecutor in his 
determination of his strategy regarding whom to prosecute.113  The 
judges illustrated that the practical focus of who to investigate and try 
from the perspective of the Council during the negotiations were the 
important political and military leaders;114 whereas, from Secretary-
General Annan’s perspective, it would include the top leaders plus 
anyone else that was found to be among those who carried out the worst 
of the crimes perpetrated in Sierra Leone.115 
Second, Trial Chamber I seemed to confirm the interpretation that 
the phrase those “who bear the greatest responsibility” was sufficiently 
flexible phraseology to capture (1) all those who held high ranking 
positions and (2) those whose crimes were so cruel that they would be 
among the worst perpetrators of the mayhem during the Sierra Leone 
Civil War.116  The caveat, of course, was that the judges unanimously, 
and correctly in my view, determined that the UNSC clearly stated 
preference for the “greatest responsibility” language signaled that the 
leadership role of the suspect should be the primary consideration with 
the severity of a crime and its massive nature bearing only secondary 
importance to the decision.117 
Overall, when assessed using the language of the three-part 
interpretive scheme suggested above, the Trial Chamber I judges 
concluded that Fofana fell within the political-military leader category 
instead of the killer-perpetrator category, the former being the main 
criterion that presumably guided his prosecutorial indictment.  In fact, in 
its judgment on the merits, Trial Chamber I found that Fofana was one 
of the top three men in the so-called Holy Trinity of the CDF 
organization.  It underscored, much like the founders of the SCSL did 
during the negotiations of the constitutive instruments, that greatest 
responsibility should, at least partly, be understood as a reflection of 
 
112. Id. ¶ 38. 
113. Id. ¶¶ 24–25, 27. 
114. Id. ¶¶ 22–25. 
115. Letter dated Jan. 12, 2001 from Secretary-General, supra note 102, para. 2. 
116. See Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, Decision on the Preliminary Defence 
Motion, ¶ 39. 
117. Id. at ¶ 40. 
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rank or position of the suspect in the organization(s) that perpetrated 
the crimes within the subject matter jurisdiction of the international 
tribunal.118  This point, therefore, seems like a helpful clarification to the 
jurisprudence and the literature on personal jurisdiction in international 
criminal courts. 
C. Greatest Responsibility as a Guideline for Exercise of Prosecutorial 
Discretion 
The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) Case, which was 
heard by the judges of Trial Chamber II, involved three mutinying 
soldiers from the Sierra Leone Army who organized a coup d’etat that 
unseated the democratically elected Kabbah government.119  Once they 
assumed power, the three suspects directed others within their 
command and control to commit some of the most brutal acts witnessed 
during the Sierra Leone conflict.120  Unlike the Fofana case, none of the 
three defense teams in the AFRC joint trial filed preliminary challenges 
objecting to the court’s assertion of personal jurisdiction over their 
clients during the limited twenty-one day period following the release of 
the prosecution disclosure under the SCSL Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence.121  It is unclear whether this was just an oversight or a 
deliberate defense strategy.  However, at the halfway point of the trial 
when the prosecution had rested its case-in-chief, the defendants 
addressed the issue as part of their no case to answer or motion for 
judgment of acquittal submissions.122 
For example, Brima contended that the reference in Article 1(1) and 
15 of the SCSL Statute to persons who bear the greatest responsibility 
was a “limitation on the Court’s jurisdiction as to which persons may or 
may not be prosecuted and creates an evidentiary burden to be satisfied 
by the Prosecution.”123  According to the defense, the prosecutor had not 
discharged his burden because its witnesses instead showed that other 
 
118. See id. ¶¶ 38–40. 
119. Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 4, 316, 432, 507 (June 
20, 2007). 
120. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 233–39. 
121. Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, Decision on the Preliminary Defence Motion; 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence Rule 72(A), supra note 90. 
122. Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Joint Legal Part Defence Motion for Judgment of 
Acquittal Under Rule 98, ¶¶ 1–2 (Dec. 13, 2005).  
123. Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Decision on Defence Motion for Judgment of 
Acquittal Pursuant to Rule 98, ¶ 28 (March 31, 2006). 
11 JALLOH (DO NOT DELETE) 4/13/2013  5:12 PM 
890 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [96:863 
more prominent military leaders higher in rank, not their accused clients 
who were only lower ranked non-commissioned officers, bore greatest 
responsibility for the heinous offenses perpetrated in Sierra Leone.124  In 
its response, the prosecution made a two-pronged argument.  First, 
there was no jurisdictional threshold that had to be met under Article 
1(1).  Second, the question of whether an accused is among those who 
bears greatest responsibility ought to only be determined after the 
conclusion of the trial.125  Alternatively, and in any event, based on the 
evidence presented up to that point in the trial, a reasonable trier of fact 
could have found the accused to fall within the court’s personal 
jurisdiction.126 
In its judgment, Trial Chamber II reviewed the documents discussing 
the history of the personal jurisdiction provision; in particular, it 
examined two letters exchanged between the UNSG and the Council in 
2001.127  The chamber correctly observed that in the January 12, 2001 
letter, the UNSC rejected Annan’s preferred “most responsible” 
personal jurisdiction language in favor or retaining its own “‘greatest 
responsibility’ formulation.”128  The Secretary-General had insisted on 
clarifying that the greatest responsibility should not be taken to mean 
that the court’s personal jurisdiction was limited to “political and 
military leaders” only, a position which the Council subsequently 
appeared to approve in its January 31, 2001 reply.129  This SCSL chamber 
found that “greatest responsibility” personal jurisdiction “solely 
purports to streamline the focus of prosecutorial strategy.”130  The judges 
observed that the phrase, understood in its ordinary sense, was intended 
to include, at a minimum, two groups of perpetrators, at the top of 
which were the political and military leaders of the parties to the 
conflict.131  They emphasized, nevertheless, that the broad language used 
in the provision implied that an even wider range of individuals, 
presumably including ordinary combatants whose conduct might have 
been very egregious, were all potentially prosecutable before the 
 
124. Id. 
125. Id. ¶ 29. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. ¶¶ 32–33. 
128. Id. ¶ 32. 
129. Id. ¶¶ 33–34. 
130. Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 653 (June 20, 2007) (emphasis added). 
131. Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Decision on Defence Motion, ¶¶ 34–35. 
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court.132 
It seems apparent but surprising that, in reaching two diverging 
conclusions, the two sets of judges in each of the SCSL trial chambers 
examined the same drafting history and historical documents.  While 
they agreed on the importance of those documents and relied on the 
analysis contained therein, each chamber’s legal reasoning towards their 
respective conclusions differed.133  The question is, why?  Two reasons 
stand out.  First, it would seem that the judges of Trial Chamber II did 
not read in their entirety either the drafting history of Article 1(1) and 
the subsequent correspondence between Secretary-General Annan and 
the Council.  After the Secretary-General’s January 12, 2001 letter 
proposing that the Council switch from its preferred, but apparently 
narrower, “greatest responsibility” formulation to his alternative and 
purportedly wider “most responsible” standard for personal jurisdiction, 
he conceded that, in rejecting his alternative proposal, the Council was 
thus “limiting the focus of the Special Court to those who played a 
leadership role.”134  He pled, however, that the phrase should not be 
construed to “mean that the personal jurisdiction is limited to the 
political and military leaders only.”135  Indeed, in his view, this 
determination in a concrete case would initially have to be made by the 
prosecutor and, ultimately, by the court itself.  The President of the 
Council, in a somewhat ambiguous, subsequent reply, stated that the 
UNSC shared in the Secretary-General’s “analysis of the importance 
and role of the phrase ‘persons who bear the greatest responsibility.’”136 
Second, Trial Chamber I introduced a nuance when it reached the 
conclusion that greatest responsibility was both a jurisdictional 
requirement in Article 1(1) and also a description of the prosecutorial 
duty as fleshed out in Article 15.  This group of judges emphasized the 
second part of the January 12, 2001, letter from the Secretary-General 
to the Council, in which it accepted that the particular reference made in 
the second sentence of Article 1(1) would then explicitly encompass 
“those leaders who, in committing such crimes, have threatened the 
 
132. See id. ¶ 35. 
133. Compare id. ¶¶ 32–34, with Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, 
Decision on the Preliminary Defence Motion on the Lack of Personal Jurisdiction Filed on 
Behalf of Accused Fofana, ¶¶ 22–25 (Mar. 3, 2004). 
134. Letter dated Jan. 12, 2001 from Secretary-General, supra note 102, para. 2; see also 
Secretary-General, Report on SCSL, supra note 4, ¶¶ 30–31. 
135. Letter dated Jan. 12, 2001 from Secretary-General, supra note 102, para. 2.  
136. Letter dated Jan. 31, 2001 from Pres. of S.C., supra note 20, para. 1. 
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establishment of and implementation of the peace process in Sierra 
Leone.”137  Secretary-General Annan understood the second sentence to 
serve as “guidance to the Prosecutor in determining his or her 
prosecutorial strategy.”138  The UNSC, in a subsequent reply to him, also 
endorsed that clarification that the words in the second sentence of 
Article 1(1), following the comma, were intended as a type of guideline 
to frame the prosecutorial strategy.139  This gave credence to the later 
Trial Chamber I position that the effect of that preference for the 
greatest responsibility, instead of the people most responsible language, 
meant that leadership, instead of severity of the crime, ought to be the 
primary consideration when determining which suspect to prosecute.140  
In other words, even though the two trial chambers used two 
different routes and Trial Chamber I felt that leadership, as a criterion, 
was to have primacy over severity, the judges from both chambers were 
on essentially the same page that greatest responsibility as phrased in 
the statute meant that both political military leaders as well as killer-
perpetrators could be prosecuted.  But Trial Chamber I correctly 
distinguished between the first sentence of Article 1(1) (which it read as 
outlining the personal jurisdiction) and the second sentence (which put 
in place the criteria—later explicitly developed in Article 15—that 
would serve to guide or circumscribe prosecutorial discretion towards a 
particular class of obstructionist individuals).141  Whereas, for its part, 
Trial Chamber II interpreted the second part of the phrase in Article 
1(1) as being subsumed by the first and reasoned that both elements, 
taken as one, did not establish a jurisdictional requirement, but rather, it 
functioned as additional guidance for the prosecutor’s strategy.142  In 
other words, to the latter group of judges, Article 1(1) was not a 
jurisdictional clause as much as it was a guidance clause.  However, the 
Trial Chamber II ruling appears hard to reconcile with the fact that the 
rest of the elements in Article 1(1) of the Statute explicitly referred to 
matters of (geographic, territorial, and temporal) jurisdiction only.  The 
decision also failed to plausibly explain why the same “greatest 
 
137. Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, Decision on the Preliminary Defence Motion, 
¶¶ 38, 40. 
138. Letter dated Jan. 31, 2001 from Pres. of S.C., supra note 20, para. 1. 
139. Id. 
140. Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, Decision on the Preliminary Defence Motion, 
¶¶ 39–40. 
141. Id. 
142. Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 653 (June 20, 2007). 
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responsibility” language separately found its way into Article 15, which 
stated the functions of the prosecutor.  
As we will see presently, when the Appeals Chamber confronted this 
same question, it adopted lock-stock-and-barrel the Trial Chamber II 
reasoning that greatest responsibility, as worded in Article 1(1) of the 
SCSL Statute, was solely a guideline to the prosecutor for the exercise 
of his discretion instead of a jurisdictional requirement.  It is submitted 
that this conclusion, which effectively endorsed the faulty prosecution 
and Trial Chamber II reasoning, was not necessarily borne out by the 
travaux préparatoires143 of the SCSL’s founding instruments. 
D. The Appeals Chamber Weighs In 
Because the two trial chambers of the court had disagreed on the 
interpretation of “greatest responsibility,” it fell to the Appeals 
Chamber to break the tie and furnish an authoritative interpretation of 
the clause once and for all.  Santigie Borbor Kanu, the third defendant 
in the Brima trial, raised greatest responsibility as his first ground in the 
appeal of his conviction. He claimed that the trial court erred when it 
failed to establish its proper jurisdiction over him pursuant to Article 
1(1).144  In assessing his plea, the Appeals Chamber first distinguished 
separation of power issues relating to the competence of the court, its 
organizational structure, and the role of the prosecutor as set out in the 
SCSL Statute vis-à-vis the chambers.145   
To begin, it assessed the role of the prosecutor set out in Article 
15.146  It then observed that, flowing from that rule, he is mandated to act 
as “a separate organ” and is therefore barred from seeking or receiving 
instructions from any government or from any other source.147  
Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber concluded, “[i]t is evident that it is 
the prosecutor who has the responsibility and competence to determine 
who are to be prosecuted as a result of investigation undertaken by 
him.”148  It is then up to the chambers, as the adjudicative organ, to “try 
 
143. See Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, Decision on the Preliminary Defence 
Motion, ¶ 40. 
144. Brima, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, Kanu’s Submissions to Grounds of Appeal, 
¶¶ 1.1–.30 (Sept. 13, 2007), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl/Public/SCSL-04-
16%20AFRC%20APPEAL%20DOCS/SCSL-04-16-A-647%20A.pdf.  
145. Brima, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, Judgement, ¶¶ 280–81. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. ¶ 280 (emphasis omitted). 
148. Id. ¶ 281. 
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such persons who the prosecutor has consequently brought before it as 
persons who bear the greatest responsibility.”149  Put more succinctly, the 
decision as to whether someone bears greatest responsibility is made by 
the prosecutor, during his investigations, and is not one for the judges 
whose sole function it is to adjudicate the individual cases brought 
before them.   
This position is correct insofar as it demarcates the sharp division of 
responsibilities between the prosecutorial and judicial organs of the 
court.  But, while generally true, this separation of powers logic should 
not be taken too far.  Indeed, as offered by the appeals court, this 
general argument is insufficient to dispose of the specific question of 
who can and should determine who has greatest responsibility for 
prosecutions before the court.  Neither did it resolve the question 
whether the language is a jurisdictional threshold or only some type of 
prosecutorial guidance.  The result reveals errors in the judicial 
reasoning.  For example, Trial Chamber II had similarly reasoned that, 
because of the separation of the prosecutorial and judicial roles in the 
court’s founding instrument, Article 15 of the Statute even implied that 
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in bringing a case against a 
particular accused was not reviewable by the court.150  This was a 
broader finding than even the prosecutor would have expected.  In fact, 
he had conceded in the briefing process, both at trial and during the 
appeal, that a discretionary decision in choosing whom to prosecute is 
reviewable by the judges if exercised in a manifestly unreasonable 
manner, for instance, by violating the rights of the accused through 
abuse of process or where the power is exercised for impermissible or 
discriminatory motives.151 
In a nutshell then, both the Appeals Chamber and Trial Chamber 
II’s interpretation of Article 1(1), as a whole, was that the language 
delineated the outer boundaries of how far the prosecutor can go when 
exercising her discretion.  There are obvious difficulties with this 
conclusion, which the judges did not address in either the trial or 
appellate decisions.  Among other issues, this stance ignores why a 
traditional jurisdictional provision setting out the competence of an ad 
 
149. Id. 
150. Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgement, ¶ 654. 
151. Id. ¶ 643; Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Decision on Defence Motion for 
Judgment of Acquittal Pursuant to Rule 98, ¶ 29 (Mar. 31, 2006); Prosecutor v. Norman, Case 
No. SCSL-04-14-PT, Decision on the Preliminary Defence Motion on the Lack of Personal 
Jurisdiction Filed on Behalf of Accused Fofana, ¶ 7 (Mar. 3, 2004). 
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hoc international criminal court would be adopted by the framers of a 
statute only to be reduced to a simple guideline for prosecutorial policy 
at a later time.  A related concern is that the judges did not speak to the 
obvious link between Article 1(1), which usually enumerates the 
personal jurisdiction of the tribunal, with Article 15(1), which defined 
the power of the prosecutor, when it provided that he or she shall be 
responsible for the investigation and prosecution of persons who bear 
the greatest responsibility for the crimes committed in Sierra Leone 
after November 30, 1996.  In other words, why would the drafters adopt 
Article 15(1) if Article 1(1) serves essentially the same purpose?  
Conversely, why would they include Article 1(1) if Article 15(1) 
sufficiently described both the court’s jurisdiction and the mandate of 
the prosecutor?  The answer is that they adopted each of these separate 
provisions because each played a distinctive role in the statute: the 
former setting out the jurisdiction of the court and the latter outlining 
the functions and limitations imposed on the prosecutor and his exercise 
of his power.  
In Kanu’s appeal, the prosecution had further argued that the 
Appeals Chamber should not hold the phrase “persons who bear the 
greatest responsibility” as a test criterion or a distinct jurisdictional 
threshold.152  To do so, according to the prosecution, would lead to an 
“absurd interpretation”153 requiring a factual determination at the pre-
trial stage that there is no person who has been indicted who bears 
greater responsibility than the particular accused when it would be 
impossible to determine the precise scope of criminal liability before the 
trial concludes.  Yet, at the same time, it would be “unworkable to 
suggest that this determination should be made by the Trial or Appeals 
Chamber at the end of the trial.”154  By analogy to Article 1 of the ICTY 
and ICTR Statutes, which provide for prosecution of “persons 
responsible,” the prosecution submitted that construing “greatest 
responsibility” as a jurisdictional requirement would imply that those 
other tribunals could only prosecute those who are actually guilty.155 
Adopting the prosecution’s line of argument, the Appeals Chamber, 
in a crucial statement that betrayed the real issue underpinning the 
court’s conclusion, ruled as follows: 
 
152. Brima, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, Judgement, ¶¶ 274–75. 
153. Id. ¶ 274.  
154. Id. 
155. Id. 
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[I]t is inconceivable that after a long and expensive trial the Trial 
Chamber could conclude that although the commission of 
serious crimes has been established beyond reasonable doubt 
against the accused, the indictment ought to be struck out on the 
ground that it has not been proved that the accused was not one 
of those who bore the greatest responsibility.156 
With respect, the Appeals Chamber, like Trial Chamber II, which 
first accepted this reasoning, fell into analytical error.  For one thing, it 
assumes that a determination that greatest responsibility was a personal 
jurisdiction requirement implied that the judges had to find at the pre-
trial stage, in violation of the presumption of innocence and before even 
hearing any evidence, that there is no other person that bore greater 
responsibility than the particular accused before the court.  For another 
thing, without referring to the prosecution evidence, it suggests that the 
case would not necessarily have been proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Both these propositions seem untenable.  The better view 
appears to be that advanced by Trial Chamber I, which held in its 
Fofana preliminary decision that an assessment of whether someone can 
be said to bear greatest responsibility could be handled differently by 
assessing, during the indictment review stage, whether the prosecution 
had made out a prima facie case that a particular suspect appears to be 
one of the individuals bearing greatest responsibility for what happened 
in a particular armed conflict.157  If there is basic evidence supporting the 
prosecution’s case, then the trial would proceed, much like it would with 
respect to the other jurisdictional criteria that had to be met, for 
example, convincing the judges that the suspect appears to have 
committed crimes within the jurisdiction of the SCSL.158 Another 
possibility is for the greatest responsibility issue to be considered at the 
Rule 98 (no case to answer) stage, when the judges would have heard all 
the evidence from the prosecution.  They could then decide, on the 
standard reflecting that stage of the process, if there was substantial 
evidence that—if believed—would appear to support the charges in the 
indictment such as to put the defendant to answer the prosecution case 
made up to that point of the trial.  
 
156. Id. ¶ 283. 
157. Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 91–92 (Aug. 2, 2007). 
158. Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, Decision on the Preliminary 
Defence Motion on the Lack of Personal Jurisdiction Filed on Behalf of Accused Fofana, 
¶¶ 28–45 (Mar. 3, 2004). 
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More fundamentally, the Appeals Chamber, in endorsing the 
prosecutor’s argument, failed to distinguish between the ICTY and the 
ICTR, both of which were differently situated vis-à-vis the SCSL.  
Among other things, the question of personal jurisdiction did not arise 
in the UN twin tribunals in the way it did at the Sierra Leone court, nor 
did it bear the same type of import, because those other ad hoc courts 
were not saddled with the same explicit limitations on their jurisdiction 
or on the powers of the prosecutor as was the SCSL.  
The crucial question arises whether the drafting history of the 
Statute of the SCSL reflected the position taken by the Appeals 
Chamber and Trial Chamber II. In the next part of this paper, I will 
argue that the Appeals Chamber misconstrued Article 1 of the Statute.  
I submit that, clouded by its concern for the practicalities of finding 
differently on the personal jurisdiction provision for the concrete cases 
before them, the appeals court misinterpreted the provision.  I will 
contend that Trial Chamber I, which methodically reviewed the greatest 
responsibility formula with closer and more complete reference to the 
drafting history, more accurately reflected the intention of the drafters 
of the SCSL Statute.  That intention was that Article 1(1) would 
establish the personal jurisdiction of the court, while Article 15(1) would 
further circumscribe the discretion of the prosecutor to pursue only a 
limited class of suspects deemed to bear greatest responsibility.  
Ultimately, as I have argued in this paper, despite their various 
differences, the overall conclusion to draw from the Sierra Leone court 
case law seems to be that the greatest responsibility language was 
sufficiently broad to ensure that the tribunal could prosecute individuals 
from both the political-leader and the killer-perpetrator groups.  That 
much agreement existed between most if not all of the judges, even if 
their reasoning towards that conclusion differed.   
IV. DISCERNING THE ACTUAL MEANING OF “GREATEST 
RESPONSIBILITY” 
The drafting history of Article 1(1) in the Statute of the SCSL 
supports the argument that at least part of the provision was initially 
intended as a jurisdictional requirement, while another part of the 
provision was intended as a sort of redline not to cross or guideline to 
limit the prosecutorial strategy.  An examination of the ordinary textual 
meaning of the provisions, in accordance with Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties demonstrates this theory.  Article 
31, in relevant part, provides that: 
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1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty 
in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 
[Emphasis added]. 
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a 
treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its 
preamble and annexes . . . 
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the 
context . . . 
4. [Any] special meaning given to a term if it is established 
that the parties so intended.159 
As the agreement between the U.N. and the Government of Sierra 
Leone constitutes a bilateral treaty,160 Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) is applicable.161  The Statute 
of the court, which of course contains the identical provision on personal 
jurisdiction, is an annex to the UN-Sierra Leone Agreement and 
therefore forms an integral part of the treaty.162  The ordinary meaning 
of the phrase “to prosecute persons who bear the greatest 
responsibility” in Article 1(1) of those two instruments can therefore be 
read in light of the context; as well as the preamble, object, and purpose 
of the provision and the statute; the court’s intended role to ensure 
accountability for international crimes committed in Sierra Leone; and 
the special meaning accorded to the term by the founders of the SCSL 
as well as in light of the tribunal’s actual practice. 
A. The Ordinary Meaning of “Persons Who Bear the Greatest 
Responsibility” 
Let us examine, using a standard English dictionary, each of the 
terms in the phrase “to prosecute persons who bear the greatest 
responsibility.”  The Oxford English Dictionary defines “person” in 
various ways.  For our purposes the most relevant is the following: “an 
individual human being; a man, woman or child;” and, as used in a 
technical legal sense, as “[a] human being (natural person) or body 
 
159. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 
[hereinafter Vienna Convention] (emphasis added). 
160. See Secretary-General, Report on SCSL, supra note 4, ¶ 9. 
161. Vienna Convention, supra note 159, art. 1. 
162. SCSL Statute, supra note 3, art. 1(1); U.N.-Sierra Leone Agreement, supra note 1, 
art. 1.  
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corporate or corporation (artificial person), having rights and duties 
recognized by the law.”163  It is clear from even the ordinary dictionary 
meaning that the term “person” refers most likely to a natural person.  
So far, all the SCSL prosecutions have related to natural persons, 
although there is nothing to foreclose trials of legal persons.  That said, 
in the context of this particular Article, this issue does not appear to 
have a major bearing on the argument here so it need not detain us. 
The noun “who” is used “[a]s the ordinary interrogative pronoun, in 
the nominative singular or plural, used of a person or persons: 
corresponding to what of things.”164  More specifically, it is “[a]s 
compound relative in the nominative in general or indefinite sense: Any 
one that . . . .”165 
The term “bear,” which is the root word for “bearing,” means “to 
carry; to sustain; to thrust, press; to bring forth.”166  Bearing is therefore 
“the action of carrying or conveying” or “[t]he carrying of oneself (with 
reference to the manner); carriage, deportment; behaviour, 
demeanour.”167 
Of course, “the” is a definite article.  As used in Article 1(1) of the 
SCSL Statute outlining the personal jurisdiction, it modifies or rather 
particularizes the superlative “greatest” as a way of connoting that the 
tribunal is or should be most concerned.  It thus essentially captures the 
notion of individuals that belong to a class or group of persons bearing 
relatively greater responsibility, although, admittedly, the idea of those 
with which it should be most concerned does not necessarily imply 
exclusivity. 
“Greatest” is, of course, the “superlative of great in various 
senses.”168  As used ordinarily, “the greatest” is a reference to “[t]hat 
which is great; great things, aspects, qualities, etc. collectively; also, great 
quantity, large amount.”169  When used to describe persons who bear the 
qualities of “being great,” the Oxford English Dictionary clarifies that it 
is an allusion to persons “[e]minent by reason of birth, rank, wealth, 
power, or position; of high social or official position; of eminent rank or 
 
163. 11 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 597 (2nd ed. 1989) (emphasis omitted). 
164. 20 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 288–89 (2nd ed. 1989). 
165. Id. at 289. 
166. 2 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 20 (2nd ed. 1989). 
167. Id. at 26. 
168. 6 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 801 (2nd ed. 1989). 
169. Id. at 800 (footnote omitted). 
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place.”170  Greatest is, more helpfully in our context, an additional way of 
denoting “conditions, actions, or occurrences; with reference to degree 
or extent . . . . [and of] things, actions, [or] events . . . [o]f more than 
ordinary importance, weight, or distinction; important, weighty; 
distinguished, prominent; famous, renowned.”171 
As to “responsibility,” it is defined as “[t]he state or fact of being 
responsible . . . for . . . [a] charge, trust, or duty, for which one is 
responsible.”172 
From the above definitions, we can distill from the ordinary 
dictionary meaning of each of the words when combined together and 
viewed in their context, that the phrase “persons who bear the greatest 
responsibility” is a description of two separate but not entirely distinct 
ideas.  First, it describes a person of high rank, position, or power who 
carries out certain actions and brings forth events or conditions of more 
than ordinary importance, and for which, given the core purpose of the 
SCSL to administer justice, the tribunal should investigate and 
prosecute the individual. 
Second, and flowing from the above definitions, we can also see that 
the ordinary meaning of the phrase is also a reference to the degree or 
amount of something or event that a person engages upon as part of a 
certain type of behavior—in this case, the commission of crimes during 
the course of the Sierra Leone armed conflict.  Individual criminal 
liability was rightly deemed necessary for those actions or events.  It also 
reveals the state or fact of being in charge of or of having a duty or 
obligation towards a person or thing, which was then breached by those 
persons who fall within the personal jurisdiction of the court.  A 
reference to the drafting history will demonstrate that these two 
ordinary definitions of the personal jurisdiction provision were also 
expressed during the negotiations of the agreement creating the SCSL. 
As argued above, and as will be further detailed in the next section, 
focusing specifically on the drafting history, the category of persons over 
which the court was to have jurisdiction was always going to be limited.  
The Council’s preference was evidently that the leadership role or 
command authority of a suspect should be the principal criterion for the 
application of the greatest responsibility formulation.173 Whereas, the 
 
170. Id. at 797. 
171. Id. (formatting omitted). 
172. 13 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 742 (2nd ed. 1989). 
173. U.N. President of the S.C., Letter dated Dec. 22, 2000 from the President of the 
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Secretary-General’s view was that the gravity, scale or massive nature of 
the crime should also be taken into account, if not the main 
consideration, for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.174  Bear in mind 
that while the former seemingly endorsed the juxtaposition of these two 
separate ideas, according to Trial Chamber I, the Council ultimately saw 
the scale or gravity of a particular crime as being of secondary, instead 
of primary, importance vis-à-vis the leadership or functional positions 
held by the suspects.175 
B. The Drafting History of “Persons Who Bear Greatest Responsibility” 
Under Article 31(2) of the VCLT, in addition to the preamble and 
annexes, the context for a treaty is additionally comprised of any 
subsequent agreements relating to the treaty made between all the 
parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty.176 
The four paragraphs of the preamble to the UN-Sierra Leone 
Agreement refer to Security Council Resolution 1315, adopted on 
August 14, 2000, in which the Council expressed deep concern at the 
very serious crimes committed within the “territory of Sierra Leone 
against the people of Sierra Leone and United Nations and associated 
personnel and at the prevailing situation of impunity.”177  It therefore 
asked the Secretary-General to negotiate an agreement with the Sierra 
Leone government to “create an independent special court to prosecute 
persons who bear the greatest responsibility” for the commission of the 
serious international and Sierra Leonean law violations committed.178 
The same language contained in the resolution was reiterated 
verbatim in Article 1(1) of the SCSL Statute, which prescribed the 
competence of the court and delimited its core jurisdictional 
components.179  In the Statute, as opposed to Agreement, however, a 
clarification was added to the effect of “including those leaders who, in 
 
Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General, para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/2000/1234 (Dec. 
22, 2000) [hereinafter Letter dated Dec. 22, 2000 from Pres. of S.C.].  
174. See Secretary-General, Report on SCSL, supra note 4, ¶ 30. 
175. Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, Decision on the Preliminary 
Defence Motion on the Lack of Personal Jurisdiction Filed on Behalf of Accused Fofana, 
¶ 40 (Mar. 3, 2004). 
176. Vienna Convention, supra note 159, art. 31(2). 
177. S.C. Res. 1315, supra note 14, pmbl.; see also U.N.-Sierra Leone Agreement, supra 
note 1, pmbl. 
178. S.C. Res. 1315, supra note 14, ¶ 1; see also U.N.-Sierra Leone Agreement, supra 
note 1, pmbl. 
179. SCSL Statute, supra note 3, art. 1(1); S.C. Res. 1315, supra note 14, ¶ 3. 
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committing such crimes, have threatened the establishment of and 
implementation of the peace process in Sierra Leone.”180  Besides the 
text of those two instruments, the travaux préparatoires181 reveal a 
subsequent discussion between, on the one hand, internal organs of the 
U.N. (the Security Council and the Secretary-General), and on the other 
hand, the U.N. as a single entity vis-à-vis the other party (Sierra Leone). 
In Resolution 1315, the UNSC directed the Secretary-General that 
the personal jurisdiction of the tribunal shall cover only “persons who 
bear the greatest responsibility for the commission of crimes” in Sierra 
Leone.182  As the Secretary-General later tried to explain, the Council 
intended that phrase to mean two things, which also appear to coincide 
with the ordinary dictionary meaning discerned in the previous 
section.183 
In his Report to the Security Council explaining the steps he had 
taken to implement Resolution 1315, the Secretary-General suggested 
that an alternative phrase, “persons most responsible,” replace “greatest 
responsibility.”184 Secretary-General Annan rationalized this suggestion 
as follows: 
While those “most responsible” obviously include the political or 
military leadership, others in command authority down the chain 
of command may also be regarded “most responsible” judging by 
the severity of the crime or its massive scale.  “Most 
responsible[,]” therefore, denotes either a leadership or 
authority position of the accused, and a sense of the gravity, 
seriousness or massive scale of the crime.  It must be seen, 
however, not as a test criterion or a distinct jurisdictional 
threshold, but as a guidance to the Prosecutor in the adoption of 
a prosecution strategy and in making decisions to prosecute in 
individual cases.185 
However, the Council did not endorse that proposal because, for one 
thing, it implicitly disagreed that the phrase “those most responsible” 
 
180. Compare SCSL Statute, supra note 3, art. 1(1), with U.N.-Sierra Leone Agreement, 
supra note 1, art. 1(1). 
181. See supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
182. S.C. Res. 1315, supra note 14, ¶ 3. 
183. Secretary-General, Report on SCSL, supra note 4, ¶ 30; see also Letter dated Jan. 
12, 2001 from Secretary-General, supra note 105, paras. 2–3. 
184. Secretary-General, Report on SCSL, supra note 4, ¶¶ 29–31. 
185. Id. ¶ 30. 
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was broader than the phrase those “bearing greatest responsibility.”186  
The President of the Security Council, in a December 22, 2000 letter, 
rejected the Secretary-General’s proposed modification to the personal 
jurisdiction provision.187  The UNSC reiterated its preference contained 
in Resolution 1315 that jurisdiction should extend to only those persons 
who bear the greatest responsibility for the commission of crimes under 
national and international law.188  He put it as follows: “The members of 
the Security Council believe that, by thus limiting the focus of the 
Special Court to those who played a leadership role, the simpler and 
more general formulations suggested in the appended draft will be 
appropriate.”189  It seems apparent enough, then, that the Council’s main 
interest was to hone in on those holding a leadership role, as the judges 
of Trial Chamber I have also confirmed. 
In the Secretary-General’s response to the President of the Security 
Council, which followed about three weeks later (January 12, 2001), he 
canvassed the difference between the two positions.190  He then tried to 
reframe his argument to again reassert the relevance of the gravity, scale 
and severity of the crimes—a point that he had initially made when he 
suggested that “the term ‘most responsible’ would not necessarily 
exclude children between 15 and 18 years of age” from possible 
responsibility for crimes within the SCSL jurisdiction.191  The question 
surrounding the responsibility of child soldiers, who had been some of 
the most notorious perpetrators of atrocities during the war, was one of 
the thorniest issues for the Sierra Leonean negotiators.192  So the 
Secretary-General effectively used that issue as a trump card to 
emphasize why the gravity of the crimes is a vital consideration in 
addition to the functional (leadership) position held by the suspect.  He 
wrote in his report, as follows: 
While it is inconceivable that children could be in a political or 
military leadership position (although in Sierra Leone the rank 
of “Brigadier” was often granted to children as young as 11 
years), the gravity and seriousness of the crimes they have 
 
186. See Letter dated Dec. 22, 2000 from Pres. of S.C., supra note 173. 
187. Id.  
188. Id. para. 1; see S.C. Res. 1315, supra note 14, ¶ 3. 
189. Letter dated Dec. 22, 2000 from Pres. of S.C., supra note 174, para. 1. 
190. Letter dated Jan. 12, 2001 from Secretary-General, supra note 103, para. 1–2. 
191. Secretary-General, Report on SCSL, supra note 4, ¶ 31. 
192. Id. ¶ 34. 
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allegedly committed would allow for their inclusion within the 
jurisdiction of the Court.193 
With hindsight, we know that the evidence that came out of the trials 
never supported this contention.  However, the foregoing extract does 
indicate that at least one of the negotiators, the UNSG, intended the 
gravity of the conduct to be a crucial element of greatest responsibility 
personal jurisdiction.  The above implicitly accepts that the Council’s 
purpose in framing jurisdiction this way was to limit the prosecutorial 
investigations to those in leadership position.  Going by the reasoning of 
Trial Chamber I, which discerned this singular thrust that leadership was 
or should be the determinative criterion for prosecutorial decisions, the 
massive nature of the crime could and should also be taken into 
account—albeit as a secondary factor.  If this deduction is correct, and it 
does seem not only correct but also reasonable, it would permit the 
prosecution of either, or both, of the lower ranked perpetrators in 
addition to leaders in the same jurisdiction.   
In fact, in the same report, one might also recall, Secretary-General 
Annan had claimed that the wording of Article 1(1) of the draft statute, 
as the Security Council had proposed it, did “not mean [to limit] 
personal jurisdiction . . . to the political and military leaders only.”194  
Almost as a tie breaker in case the powers that be in the UNSC 
continued to disagree with him, he observed that the determination of 
the meaning of the term “persons who bear the greatest responsibility in 
any given case falls initially to the Prosecutor, and ultimately to the 
SLSC itself.”195  Using this language, the Secretary-General seemed to 
adopt a negotiating tactic in an attempt to have his way, although he did 
not later clarify whether his position that the “most responsible” 
language should not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt,196 which 
was ultimately rejected,197 was also equally applicable to the “greatest 
 
193. Id. ¶ 31. 
194. Letter dated Jan. 12, 2001 from Secretary-General, supra note 103, para. 2. 
195. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
196. See U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated July 12, 2001 from the Secretary-General 
addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2001/693 (July 12, 2001) 
[hereinafter Letter dated July 12, 2001 from Secretary-General] (indicating acceptance of the 
agreement by the parties with no subsequent mention of the “most responsible” and “greatest 
responsibility” language). 
197. See SCSL Statute, supra note 3, art. 1(1) (containing the language “persons who 
bear the greatest responsibly”); U.N.-Sierra Leone Agreement, supra note 1, art. 1(1) 
(containing the language “persons who bear the greatest responsibility”).  
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responsibility” formulation.  In a way, he left some ambiguity in the 
hope that it would help bolster his reading, which invoked Sierra 
Leone’s concerns as well, to caution the UNSC that it would be up to 
the court’s prosecutor and judiciary to settle on the final position as to 
what greatest responsibility jurisdiction ultimately entailed.  He thus 
also sent a message to the prosecutor that he enjoyed a measure of 
discretion, despite the prescriptive greatest responsibility language 
contained in the agreement and statute.  It would seem that great weight 
can therefore be attached to the tribunal’s practice in line with that 
position as well as the VCLT principles. 
The Secretary-General’s letter then stated, with explicit reference to 
the second half of Article 1(1): 
Among those who bear the greatest responsibility for the crimes 
falling within the jurisdiction of the Special Court, particular 
mention is made of “those leaders who, in committing such 
crimes, have threatened the establishment of and 
implementation of the peace process in Sierra Leone.”  It is my 
understanding that, following from paragraph 2 above, the words 
“those leaders who . . . threaten the establishment of and 
implementation of the peace process” do not describe an element 
of the crime but rather provide guidance to the prosecutor in 
determining his or her prosecutorial strategy.  Consequently, the 
commission of any of the statutory crimes without necessarily 
threatening the establishment and implementation of the peace 
process would not detract from the international criminal 
responsibility otherwise entailed for the accused.198 
The President of the Security Council’s response to the Secretary-
General, appeared to endorse the Secretary-General’s two preferred 
ways of interpreting Article 1(1) in the following terms: 
The members of the Council share your analysis of the 
importance and role of the phrase “persons who bear the greatest 
responsibility[.”]  The members of the Council, moreover, share 
your view that the words beginning with “those leaders 
who . . . .” are intended as guidance to the Prosecutor in 
determining his or her prosecutorial strategy.199 
 
198. Letter dated Jan. 12, 2001 from Secretary-General, supra note 103, para. 3 
(emphasis added). 
199. Letter dated Jan. 31, 2001 from Pres. of S.C., supra note 20, para. 1. 
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This language was vague in that the reference to the “importance” and 
“role” of Article 1(1) provision does not entirely specify whether the 
Security Council felt that the personal jurisdiction phrase is (1) limited 
to leaders alone, or (2) not necessarily limited to leaders alone because 
it will include those whose actions were so grave that they merited 
prosecutions (even if they did not functionally hold high-ranking 
positions).  As to the second sentence of the clause, and arguably by 
implication, not the first sentence, it appears evident that the UNSC 
Security Council agreed with Annan that it does constitute a guideline 
for the prosecutor’s exercise of his discretion without necessarily serving 
as a legal ingredient or requirement of the crimes.  Thus, consistent with 
the finding of this article as shown in Part III, Article 1(1) offered two 
separate meanings: the first part of the sentence being a personal 
jurisdictional threshold; and the second part, especially when read 
together with Article 15(1) outlining the powers of the prosecutor, 
establishing a limitation for the prosecutorial application of her 
discretion though not necessarily foreclosing the extension of the 
jurisdiction to the political leaders and the killer perpetrators. 
In his last publicly available letter on the greatest responsibility 
issue, dated July 12, 2001, the Secretary-General notified the Council 
that the exchange of letters led to modifications of the text in both the 
draft UN-Sierra Leone Agreement and the Statute annexed to it.200  As 
this back and forth communication had been an internal conversation 
between two U.N. organs, he confirmed that “[t]he Government of 
Sierra Leone was consulted on these changes and by letter of 9 February 
2001 to the Legal Counsel expressed its willingness to accept the 
texts.”201  This fact, therefore, made the communication a subsequent 
agreement between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of 
the treaty in the Article 31(2) VCLT sense. 
In Fofana, Trial Chamber I, after meticulously reviewing the above 
drafting history, had also ruled that the “agreed text resulted in the 
adoption of the phrase” on personal jurisdiction as articulated in Article 
1(1) of the Statute with the specific duties of the prosecutor in that 
regard prescribed in accordance with Article 15(1).202  It was on this basis 
that the chamber concluded that “the issue of personal jurisdiction is a 
 
200. Letter dated July 12, 2001 from Secretary-General, supra note 197. 
201. Id. 
202. Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, Decision on the Preliminary 
Defence Motion on the Lack of Personal Jurisdiction Filed on Behalf of Accused Fofana, 
¶ 26 (Mar. 3, 2004). 
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jurisdictional requirement, and while it does of course guide the 
prosecutorial strategy, it does not exclusively articulate prosecutorial 
discretion, as the Prosecution has submitted.”203 
Upon closer examination, it is clear that Trial Chamber I believed, 
correctly in my view, that personal jurisdiction created a jurisdictional 
threshold.  However, the nuance in the language is that this group of 
judges did not say that “greatest responsibility” was a jurisdictional 
requirement in the entirety of the provision.  Rather, they felt that the 
“issue of personal jurisdiction” also contained language purporting to 
guide the prosecutor on how she should use her power.  It follows that it 
is correct that Article 1(1) was neither exclusively jurisdictional nor 
exclusively directed at demarcating the contours of prosecutorial 
discretion.  In contrast, Trial Chamber II, for its part, was critical of the 
judicial colleagues in the other chamber and explicitly determined that 
the “greatest responsibility” did not create a jurisdictional requirement 
because it only limited to a small category the number of persons that 
were to be prosecuted.204  Significantly, the above reading that the two 
ideas were encompassed in the same phrase as well as in that 
enumerating the prosecutors duties appears to be confirmed by the 
contents of the July 12, 2001, letter to the Council, in which the 
Secretary-General explained as follows: 
Members of the Council reiterated their understanding that, 
without prejudice to the independence of the prosecutor, the 
personal jurisdiction of the Special Court remains limited to the 
few who bear the greatest responsibility for the crimes 
committed.205 
V. CONCLUSION: LESSONS FROM THE SCSL 
In taking up previously uncharted terrain, outside the confines of the 
debates in the trials in Sierra Leone, this Article has shown that it is 
imperative for the creators of international criminal tribunals to 
properly delineate their personal jurisdiction.  The greatest 
responsibility formula used at the SCSL was politically convenient for 
the Council, which was keen to establish a cheap and time limited ad 
hoc court that would prosecute only a small group of people in Sierra 
 
203. Id. ¶ 27. 
204. See Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 653 (June 20, 2007). 
205. Letter dated July 12, 2001 from Secretary-General, supra note 197 (emphasis 
added). 
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Leone.  But, as I have shown through this original contribution to the 
literature, without further specificity, such general statements of 
personal jurisdiction in practice raise serious issues of interpretation and 
application in concrete cases due to vagueness. 
In the Cambodia Tribunal, which has the closest personal 
jurisdiction wording to that of the Sierra Leone court, an identical 
concern arose as to the meaning of Article 1(1) of the ECCC Law, 
which provided for the trial of “senior leaders of Democratic 
Kampuchea and those who were most responsible for the crimes.”206  
This phrase is in one way an improvement on what was used in Sierra 
Leone in the sense that the first part of the phrase specifically identifies 
senior leaders while the second part mentions those most responsible.  
In that way, the ECCC approach apparently adequately addresses the 
policy concerns of Secretary-General Annan in the Sierra Leone 
situation: that the leaders, architects, or planners of the mass crimes as 
well as their followers responsible for grave crimes should all as a prima 
facie matter be deemed prosecutable.207  The legal framework must be 
clear and accommodating, but the prosecutor should ultimately make 
the final choice.  The Cambodia formulation also reflects the general 
purpose behind internationally supported criminal prosecutions which, 
as we saw in our historical review starting with the Nuremberg Tribunal, 
had always aimed to ensure the prosecution of leaders for their crimes. 
The only difficulty is that even the ECCC phrase is still somewhat 
ambiguous.  The second part of the sentence, speaking to those most 
responsible, suggests a focus on the persons to be tried for the depravity 
or severity of their acts.  Unsurprisingly, taking a cue from the 
developments respecting their brethren at the SCSL, the defense 
counsel litigated that issue arguing, at the close of the first trial, that the 
Cambodia Tribunal lacked jurisdiction over the first defendant Duch.208  
The chamber, drawing on the logic of the Sierra Leone Court, 
determined that the accused, as a senior leader, fell within its personal 
jurisdiction as one of those most responsible.209  That conclusion was 
unsuccessfully challenged on appeal.210 
 
206. U.N.-Cambodian Agreement, supra note 35; see also G.A. Res. 57/228, ¶ 1, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/57/228 B (May 13, 2003) (approving draft of ECCC Agreement). 
207. Secretary-General, Report on SCSL, supra note 4, ¶¶ 29–30. 
208. Prosecutor v. Duch, Case No. 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, Judgment, ¶ 14 (July 26, 
2010). 
209. Id. ¶ 24–25. 
210. Duch, Case No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/SC, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 79 (Feb. 3, 2012). 
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In terms of lessons learned from Sierra Leone, it seems too early to 
draw final conclusions as to whether the SCSL jurisprudence will be 
found well reasoned enough to be followed by other courts.  That said, 
the following tentative observations may be offered with respect to the 
case law it has bequeathed us on this particular issue.  First, this type of 
clause, spelling out personal jurisdiction, should be avoided.  Failing 
that, if the “greatest responsibility” language needs to be used, it is 
important to at least attempt to define what the phrase means to say 
that a court shall prosecute those bearing greatest responsibility.  
Fortunately, this is in fact what the draft statute of the Special Tribunal 
for Kenya attempted to do.  Again, in that instance, the same logic of 
focusing on leaders in positions of authority and influence as well as 
those most vicious in committing the crimes was already evident in the 
relatively more precise definition that was offered.211  The drafters of 
that clause clearly knew of the SCSL experience, since they attempted 
to resolve some of the thorny issues that led to much ink being spilled by 
counsel and judges during the court’s decade-long life.  Regrettably, 
because the Kenya hybrid tribunal never saw the light of day, as the bill 
failed to obtain sufficient support for passage into law in the Kenyan 
Parliament,212 there was a missed opportunity to see whether that clearer 
phrase would have fared better during the concrete trials of the suspects 
responsible for the post-election violence, which rocked that country in 
December 2007. 
Second, future ad hoc tribunal statutes should explicitly state 
whether such a phrase is or is not a jurisdictional requirement that must 
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt as an element of the crime.  It 
seems obvious that it should not be treated as such, because it would 
 
211. Special Tribunal for Kenya Bill, supra note 21, pt. I § 2.  The Bill offers the 
following definition: 
“[P]ersons bearing the greatest responsibility” means a person or persons who were 
knowingly responsible for any or all of the following acts: planning, instigating, 
inciting, funding, ordering or providing other logistics which directly or indirectly 
facilitated the commission of crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal; in 
determining whether a person or persons falls within this category, the Tribunal shall 
have regard to factors including the leadership role or level of authority or decision 
making power or influence of the person concerned and the gravity, severity, 
seriousness or scale of the crime committed. 
Id. (emphasis added).  
212. Kenya: Quorum Stops the Bill on the Establishment of the Special Tribunal to Try 
Violence, AFRICAN PRESS INT’L (Fed. 6, 2009), http://africanpress.me/2009/02/06/kenya-
quorum-stops-the-bill-on-the-establishment-of-the-special-tribunal-to-try-violence/. 
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otherwise make prosecutions of concrete cases rather difficult and 
procedurally cumbersome.  This is the lesson of the Sierra Leone Court, 
which struggled throughout its trials to repeatedly make the simple 
point to defendants and their counsel that the focus of prosecution of 
persons in leadership positions did not mean that those of lower rank, in 
effective control, could not also simultaneously or alternatively be 
pursued by an international court with “greatest responsibility 
language” as the anchor of its personal jurisdiction.  Instead, as we have 
seen, attempts to judicially settle the issue led to more challenges, in 
different cases, at different stages of the trial process (pre-trial, trial, and 
appeal).  
Third, and closely related to the second point, if greatest 
responsibility is to be used to delineate the boundaries of the power that 
the tribunal prosecutors enjoy, that purpose should be stated explicitly.  
Although it seems highly unlikely, if there is another separate purpose 
for employing such language beyond limiting prosecutorial wiggle room, 
that too should be stated.  Indeed, it may be wise to include a provision 
discussing the relationship between the personal jurisdiction article and 
the limitations to the prosecutorial mandate.  This would help to avoid 
unnecessary procedural hurdles during trials of the suspects and 
arguments that the prosecution lacks the power to make choices as to 
whom to prosecute from among a wide range of potential perpetrators.  
The obviousness of that position did not make the task of the 
prosecutor’s in the SCSL any less challenging.  
Fourth, though not discussed in this Article per se, to put the matter 
beyond any doubt, consideration should also be given to clarifying that 
the judges have ex proprio motu213 power to review whether the 
prosecution has fulfilled the personal jurisdiction and other 
requirements when making a prima facie case.  It is beyond dispute that 
it is the duty of the judges to ensure fair trials that respect the rights of 
the accused take place in a given criminal trial.  It is therefore not 
enough for them to abdicate this function to the prosecution, as one 
chamber effectively did at the SCSL, by saying that they as judges were 
not empowered to review the prosecutorial organ or to imply that they 
were simply there to rubber stamp the prosecutorial allegations in an 
indictment that someone is among those bearing greatest responsibility 
for the atrocities committed during a particular conflict. 
Fifth, the drafters of statutes, especially at the United Nations Office 
 
213.  “Of one’s own accord.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 662 (9th ed. 2009). 
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of Legal Affairs, should explicitly consider stating the consequences of a 
finding that personal jurisdictional requirements had either been 
fulfilled or not.  What standard should apply to determine that it had 
been fulfilled, and at what stages of the trials?  If the threshold is not 
fulfilled, what should happen?  Would the tribunal have to release the 
defendant, and if so, should this be with or without prejudice to the 
prosecution?  These fundamental questions need some important 
answers.  Given the Sierra Leone experience, it may be helpful to 
indicate whether any such determinations require factual assessments of 
evidence or are purely legal questions to be considered by the judges 
even before the prosecution calls any witnesses.  If factual assessments 
are required, then the stage of the trial at which the point should be 
considered should be delineated keeping in mind the appropriate 
standard of proof.  If it is a legal assessment, that too should guide how 
the claims can be made, using what evidentiary burden, before reaching 
the legal conclusion.  
Finally, while this Article noted that the ICC Prosecutor has adopted 
the “greatest responsibility” standard to guide his prosecutorial policy, it 
may be worth noting that the concern about personal jurisdiction does 
not arise there in the same way as it did at the SCSL.  Although the 
structure and content of the Rome Statute makes this rather difficult, it 
may be only a matter of time for a creative defendant to argue that he 
should not be prosecuted because he is not among those bearing 
greatest responsibility for what happened in a given conflict.  
Fortunately, the phrase “greatest responsibility,” though widely used in 
ICC prosecutorial practice, is not included in the ICC statute in the 
same way it was in the founding document of the SCSL.  Its use in the 
permanent tribunal is therefore purely a function of prosecutorial 
policy, which, although logical, could also be changed at any time 
without requiring any amendments to the Rome Statute.  Consequently, 
as a prosecutorial policy, defendants should not be able to rely on the 
phrase to mount a jurisdictional challenge, at least one that would cause 
the same type of difficulties for the court as occurred in Sierra Leone.  If 
a defendant did, it would presumably be relatively easy for the pre-trial 
or trial chambers to resolve the issue on the ground that the 
prosecutorial policy is mere policy, rather than a statutory requirement.  
 
